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The most surprising thing about feminist legal scholarship on
police misconduct is that there is not much of it.' This comparative
silence is surprising because feminist legal theorists have taken it as
their mission to question everything.2 Feminist legal scholars have
investigated and critiqued a wide variety of laws and legal issues--
not just the obvious ones like employment discrimination, 3 sexual
* Professor of Law, Whittier Law School; A.B., Radcliffe Col-
lege/Harvard University; J.D., Yale Law School
1. Or not much that so identifies itself The legal discussion most relevant
to this Essay appears in Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex
and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Juris-
prudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 81-94 (1995), analyzing "the conventionally mas-
culine job of police officer to explore the disparate impact of gendered job re-
quirements," and describing pre-1995 recommendations that "feminiz[ing] the
force" of the Los Angeles Police Department would reduce the city's levels of
both general criminal violence and police abuse. Id. at 81, 86-91; see also An-
gela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 777, 793-99 (2000) (describing "the hypermasculine culture of polic-
ing"). For an excellent sociological analysis, see SUSAN L. MILLER, GENDER
AND COMMUNITY POLICING: WALKING THE TALK (1999). For a feminist his-
tory, see JANIS APPIER, POLICING WOMEN: THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE LAPD (1998). Nonlegal feminist researchers have
written fairly extensively about how both sexual identity as male or female and
gender role expectations affect organizations, including law enforcement agen-
cies. See MILLER, supra, at 65-98. On the distinction between sex and gender,
see infra note 21.
2. See, e.g., Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Eveything: The Inquiries
of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64 (1985), reprinted in
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 22-31 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993)
[hereinafter FOUNDATIONS].
3. E.g., KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND
LAw: THEORY, DocTRINE, COMMENTARY 147-246, 267-350 (2d ed. 1998)
(feminist textbook covering a wide range of employment discrimination topics,
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harassment,4 rape,5 prostitution, 6 domestic violence, 7 divorce,8 child
cases, and materials, and contrasting formal with substantive equality);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 161-201 (1989); Kathryn Abrams,
Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Gary Minda, Title VII at the Crossroads of
Employment Discrimination Law and Postmodern Feminist Theory: United
Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. and Its Implications for the Women's
Rights Movement, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 89 (1992); Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories About Women and Work; Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segre-
gation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argu-
ment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989). The illustrative citations in this and
following footnotes are inevitably idiosyncratic and incomplete; feminist legal
scholars are prolific.
4. Of course, it was not so obvious until Professor Catharine MacKinnon
gave it a voice and a name. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNoN, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979);
see also Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment
with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist
Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Har-
assment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990); Emma Coleman Jordan, Race, Gen-
der, and Social Class in the Thomas Sexual Harassment Hearings: The Hidden
Fault Lines in Political Discourse, 15 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1992); Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
5. E.g., DATE RAPE: FEMINISM, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAW (Leslie Fran-
cis ed., 1996); SusAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); David P. Bryden, Rede-
fining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317 (2000); Lynne Henderson, Rape and
Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127 (1992); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race,
and Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the
Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869 (1996); Morrison
Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at One Form of
Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35 (1995).
6. E.g., Margaret A. Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist
Discourses of Law Reform, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47 (1992); Margaret A.
Baldwin, Strategies of Connection: Prostitution and Feminist Politics, 1 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 65 (1993); Vednita Carter & Evelina Giobbe, Duet: Prostitu-
tion, Racism and Feminist Discourse, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 37 (1999);
Ann M. Lucas, Race, Class, Gender, and Deviancy: The Criminalization of
Prostitution, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 47 (1995); Catharine A. MacKin-
non, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13 (1993); Sym-
posium, Decriminalizing Prostitution: Liberalization or Dehumanization?, 1
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 101 (1993).
7. E.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING (2000); Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered
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custody and support,9 and reproductive choice.'0 They also have
analyzed broad legal subjects and systems--torts, contracts,'
2
Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1999);
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991); Zanita
E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and Wh7ite: Racialized Gender Stereo-
types in Gender Violence, 8 CoLuM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1998); G. Kristian
Miccio, Notes from the Underground: Battered Women, the State, and Con-
ceptions ofAccountability, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 133 (2000); Reva B. Sie-
gel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117 (1996); Symposium, Women, Children and Domestic Violence: Cur-
rent Tensions and Emerging Issues, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 565 (2000).
8. E.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); June Carbone & Mar-
garet F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change,
and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REv. 953 (1991); Barbara Stark, Guys and
Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce Practice, Feminist Theol;
and Family Law Doctrine, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 293 (1997).
9. E.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY
(1989); Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and
the Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1986); Mary Becker,
Matenial Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 133 (1992); Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draflees: The
Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991); Iglesias, supra
note 5, at 977-90.
10. E.g., KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
(1984); CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989);
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 488-94
(1999); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261
(1992); Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47
(1971); Robin West, Liberalism and Abortion, 87 GEO. L.J. 2117 (1999); Joan
C. Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (1991).
11. E.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993); Leslie Bender, Frontier of Legal Thought 111:
Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and
Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848; Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Si-
lence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
41 (1989); Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Re-
form for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847 (1997).
12. E.g., MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 53-107, 111-
124 (1992) (feminist analysis of contract doctrines); Patricia J. Williams, On
Being the Object of Property, in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 216-36
(1991), reprinted in part in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 594-602; Clare
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1008 (1985).
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property, 13 criminal law,14 criminal and civil procedure,' 5 criminal
sentencing, 16 judicial systems,' 7 legal education, 18 law teaching, 19
13. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Goldberg, Involuntary Servitudes: A Property-
Based Notion of Abortion Choice, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1597 (1991); Frances E.
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Rahika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human
Body, 80 B.U. L. REv. 359 (2000); Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and
Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997).
14. E.g., Dana M. Britton, Feminism in Criminology: Engendering the
Outlaw, 571 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. So. 57 (2000); Naomi Cahn,
Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49
DEPAUL L. REv. 817 (2000); Mary Irene Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or A
Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 117 (1988); Susan N. Herman, Thelma and Louise and Bonnie and
Jean: Images of Women as Criminals, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
53 (1992); Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of
African American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L.
1 (1995); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143
U. PA. L. REv. 2151 (1995); Mary Coombs, Putting Women First, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1686 (1995) (book review).
15. See Roy L. Brooks, Feminist Jurisdiction: Toward an Understanding of
Feminist Procedure, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 317 (1995); Dana Raigrodski,
Breaking Out of "Custody": A Feminist Voice in Constitutional Criminal Pro-
cedure, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1301 (1999); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" With-
out Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1682 (1991).
16. E.g., Christopher M. Alexander, Crushing Equality: Gender Equal
Sentencing in America, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 199 (1997); Joan W. How-
artb, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to Capital Ju-
rors, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1345; Melinda E. O'Neil, The Gender Gap Argument:
Exploring the Disparity of Sentencing Women to Death, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 213 (1999); Symposium, Gender and Sentencing,
8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 134 (1995).
17. E.g., Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 2195 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Task Force Reports on Women in
the Courts: The Challengefor Legal Education, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 87 (1988);
Kathleen L. Soll, Gender Bias Task Forces: How They Have Fulfilled Their
Mandate and Recommendations for Change, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 633 (1993); see, e.g., THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE,
THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: FINAL REPORT (1993), re-
printed in 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1994). By 1997 more than forty task forces
had issued reports on gender, race, and ethnic bias in the state and federal
courts. See Judith Resnik, Gender Matters, Race Matters, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTs. 219, 225 (1997).
18. E.g., Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Coin-
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law practice,20 and, more generally, constitutional guarantees of civil
rights and liberties, due process, equal protection, and freedom
of speech-to expose and oppose sex and gender2 ' bias and
mon Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101 (1988); Lani Guinier et al., Becoming
Gentlemen: Women "s Experiences at One lv League School, 143 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (1994); Mairi N. Morrison, May It Please Whose Court?: How Afoot
Court Perpetuates Gender Bias in the "Real World" of Practice, 6 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 49 (1995); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Edu-
cation of Tiventy Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1988).
19. E.g., Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be
Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61
TEMP. L. REv. 799 (1988); Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Class-
room, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Contextuali-ing the
Debate: How Feminist and Critical Race Scholarship Can Inform the Teach-
ing of Employment Discrimination Law, 44 J. LEGAL EDUc. 366 (1994);
Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clini-
cal Education, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1599 (1991); Catherine W. Hantzis,
Kingsfield and Kennedy: Reappraising the Male Models of Law School
Teaching, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1988); Vicki C. Jackson, Empiricism, Gen-
der, and Legal Pedagogy: An Experiment in a Federal Courts Seminar at
Georgetown University Law Center, 83 GEO. L.J. 461 (1994); Joan C.
Krauskoptf Touching the Elephant: Perceptions of Gender Issues in Nine Law
Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist
Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits
Go to Law School", 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 61 (1988); Elyce H. Zenoff& Kathryn
V. Lorio, What We IOzow, What We Think We Know, and hTat We Don't
Know About Women as Law Professors, 25 ARIz. L. REv. 869 (1983).
20. E.g., CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WoMEN IN LAw 79-326 (1983) (de-
scribing women in a variety of law practices); Stacy Caplow, Still in the Dark:
Disappointing Images of Women Lmyers in the Movies, 20 WOmEN's RTs. L.
REP. 55 (1999); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of
Care into ProfessionalResponsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992); Joan W.
Howarth, Women Defenders on Television: Representing Suspects and the Ra-
cial Politics of Retribution, 3 GENDER RACE & JuST. 475 (2000); Ashley
Kissinger, Civil Rights and Professional Wrongs: A Female Lmayer's Di-
lemma, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1419 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a
Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 39 (1985); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Is the Law Male? Let Me
Count the Ways, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 397 (1993); Abbe Smith, CriminalRe-
sponsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a
Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433
(1994); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunda.y
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REv. 1 (1990) (noting
how conventions of legal argument exclude women's perspectives from legal
proceedings).
21. The distinction between sex and gender in legal and other feminist the-
ory is generally the distinction between biology and culture. "[G]ender [is] to
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discrimination that often underlie ostensibly neutral structures and
principles of justice.
The sound of feminist silence is also surprising because police
misconduct-violence, corruption, violation of civil rights-is so
clearly a male problem. The most familiar narratives of police
abuses of government power and betrayals of public trust in the
United States and, especially, in Los Angeles-from the Watts insur-
rection and the McCone Commission, 22 to the police beating of Rod-
ney King and the Christopher Commission,23 to the Rampart scandal
and the Chemerinsky Report,24 spanning most of the half century
sex what masculine and feminine are to male and female." Case, supra note 1,
at 2; see also RHODE, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that in feminist theory, "sex"
generally refers to biological differences, "gender" to "culturally constructed
differences"). But see BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 3, at 1084-89 (pro-
viding collected materials that suggest that neither sex nor gender has either a
determinate physical or behavioral referent or a fixed meaning in feminist legal
theories).
22. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE L.A. RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN THE
CITY-AN END OR A BEGINNING? (1965), available at http://209.24.112.224/
DrPseudocryptonym/HellsBibliophiles/ViolencelnTheCity.html (last visited
Oct. 7, 2000) [hereinafter VIOLENCE IN THE CITY]. The commission was
chaired by John A. McCone, former director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
23. See INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1991) (the commission was chaired by Warren
Christopher, former United States Deputy Attorney General and Deputy Sec-
retary of State) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT]; see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 199-234 (1998) (offering a pre-
Rampart assessment of LAPD reforms). Human Rights Watch reported "lack
of progress" and "slow progress" in complying with Christopher Commission
recommendations. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra, at 205.
24. See ERWIN CHEMERINsKY, AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THE Los
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT'S BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT ON THE
RAMPART SCANDAL (2000) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY REPORT] (this report is
available in this issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review; however, the
pagination refers to the original version of the report available at
http://www.lacity.org/lapd-reformlchemreport.pdf.). In addition to the Board
of Inquiry Report and the Chemerinsky Report, a Rampart Independent Review
Panel of more than 100 law enforcement professionals nationwide, appointed
by the Los Angeles Police Commission, planned to issue a report shortly after
this Essay went to press, and was expected to recommend "sweeping reforms"
in LAPD handling of police misconduct charges. See Tina Daunt, Panel to
Urge Wide InternalReform of LAPD Probes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2000, at B1.
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from Los Angeles Police Chiefs Parker to Parks2 -all of them are
stories about men behaving badly.
Through their monopoly of legalized force and their defiance of
civilian authority and control, some of the Los Angeles police, at
their worst,26 have turned cruelty and indifference, violence and de-
ceit, from moral wrongs into everyday public policy-and justified
them as community service, the only way to protect the rest of us
from crime. Like an occupying army, they sweep through the mean-
est streets of the city, too often bringing neither law nor order, bru-
tally beating and shooting criminal suspects, flagrantly denying the
most basic of civil rights, fabricating evidence and even committing
perjury, twisting the criminal justice system to convict and imprison
even the legally and factually innocent." And where the failures of
the Los Angeles Police Department end, the evasions and denials by
its political leaders begin. Resisting meaningful reform and federal
supervision in words reminiscent of Southern governors and school
superintendents who defied school desegregation as hostile interfer-
ence with local prerogatives and prejudices, the city's current mayor,
its police chief, and their allies sought for months to repel the United
States Department of Justice, and along with it the Constitution and
civil rights laws that apply throughout the nation, as alien invaders of
their gang's territory.28 For now, they seem to have capitulated, 29 but
25. The references are to Police Chiefs William H. Parker, who served from
1950 to 1966, and Bernard C. Parks, who was appointed in 1997. See Terry
McDermott, Behind the Bunker Mentality, L.A. TIMs, June 11, 2000, at Al.
26. This phrasing is intended not to contradict the overwhelming evidence
that police misconduct is systemic, but to acknowledge that most police offi-
cers perform their jobs well. See CHEMERINSKY REPORT, supra note 24, at 8
(stating that despite serious problems within the LAPD, the "vast majority" of
officers are hard-working, honest, and responsible).
27. See id. at 4; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23, at 214-19; Lou
Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, § 6, at32; Michael D. Harris
& Anne La Jeunesse, Past Lawsuits Dog Most Scandal Cops, L.A. DAILY J.,
May 26, 2000, at 1; Anne La Jeunesse & Chris Ford, A Hot August Night.
Rogue Cops May Have Framed Seven in the Summer of 1996, L.A. DAMY J.,
June 2, 2000, at 1; Charles L. Lindner, Rampart: The System Has Become
Dysfunctional, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2000, at M1; McDermott, supra note 25;
Editorial, Rampart ScandalRolls On, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at B1 (listing
developments in the Rampart scandal).
28. See Erwin Chemerinsky, LAPD Must Come Under Court Order, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2000, at B9 (arguing that a consent decree is not a federal
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skeptics wonder whether the LAPD can ever overcome its long his-
tory of intransigence and reinvent itself, or succumb to reinvention
by others.3°
Studies of the police culture that perpetuates the paramilitary
mythology of police work show that police misconduct is tightly
linked to, if not directly caused by, stereotypic, aggressive, rampant
masculinity-at its worst a naked celebration of the legal and physi-
cal power to subdue, subordinate, and dehumanize the people who
become the targets of law enforcement. 31 This pattern and practice
are conjoined with a scarcely concealed contempt for a supposedly
takeover because the police commission and chief retain management and dis-
ciplinary authority); Tina Daunt, U.S. Underlines Its Determination on Police
Reform, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at B1 (reporting that Los Angeles Mayor
Richard Riordan, Police Chief Parks, and four of fifteen City Council members
strongly oppose U.S. Justice Department's demand for a consent decree to en-
sure meaningful reform, some calling it "a federal takeover of the LAPD");
Jim Newton, A Glimpse Into Future ofLAPD?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2000, at
Al [hereinafter Newton, LAPD Future] ("For months [Riordan and Parks]
pulled string after string in Los Angeles and Washington in a futile attempt to
head off the deal."); Jim Newton, Would-Be Mayors Split on U.S. Intervention
in LAPD Politics, L.A. TIMES, Sept 4, 2000, at Al.
29. See Tina Daunt, City Agrees to U.S. Reforms for LAPD, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2000, at Al; Peter Y. Hong & Tina Daunt, Parks Drops His Opposi-
tion, Commits LAPD to Decree, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at B1; Newton,
LAPD Future, supra note 28. At the time this Essay went to press, the Los
Angeles City Council had just given final approval to a consent decree con-
taining "the most sweeping set of changes ever imposed on [the LAPD] from
outside." Tina Daunt & Jim Newton, Council Oks Police Reform Pact with
U.S., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at Al.
30. See Joe Domanick, Can the LAPD Reform Itself?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2000, at MI (observing that monitor will need "superhuman tenacity" to over-
come LAPD's resistance to reform); see also Chris Ford, Rampart Will Leave
No One Untouched, L.A. DAILY J., May 12, 2000, at 1 (reporting that the
Rampart scandal is likely to have severe political consequences for many of
the people involved, particularly Chief Bernard Parks and Mayor Richard Ri-
ordan).
31. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that traditionally, police have
been "masculine crimefighters.... brave, suspicious, aloof, objective, cynical,
physically intimidating, and willing to use force and even brutality"); Harris,
supra note 1, at 781 ("[V]iolent acts are.. . , sometimes, the result of the char-
acter of masculinity itself as a cultural ideal."); id. at 793 (stating that "hyper-
masculinity" combines violence and masculinity with strong opposition to
femininity and homosexuality and strong emphasis on physical strength and
aggression; "[p]olice work has traditionally been coded hypermasculine").
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uncomprehending and ungrateful public32 that demands safety with-
out acknowledging or paying what the police believe, or purport to
believe, is the necessary price. Even good cops share this attitude.
As one officer told the Los Angeles Times, "[T]hey want a kinder,
gentler police force, but it's not a kinder, gentler society. , 33 The en-
tire criminal justice system in Los Angeles, deeply compromised by
years of acquiescence in police lying, spying, and violence, seems to
accept the LAPD's vision as its own.34 From a still broader perspec-
tive, society itself too often condones police corruption and excessive
force in the belief that law enforcement requires "direct action in the
streets" based on a military model that all but demands action outside
32. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 99-100
(documenting that some commanding officers believe that "too many LAPD
patrol officers view the public with resentment and hostility" and treat civilians
with discourtesy and disrespect); McDermott supra note 25 (noting that LAPD
officers generally discredit critics without street experience: "As numerous
officers put it, 'We're the only people in society, when we hear shots being
fired, we run toward the bullets."'); Newton, LAPD Future, supra note 28 (re-
porting that Pittsburgh police, under federal supervision similar to that pro-
posed for Los Angeles, are "fed up... with what they perceive as an ungrate-
ful public").
33. McDermott, supra note 25 (quoting Randy Cochran, a LAPD officer
who spent most of his twenty-six years on the force on patrol in South Los An-
geles).
34. See CHEMERINSKY REPORT, supra note 24, at 6 ('Prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges must share responsibility when innocent people are con-
victed."); Scott Glover & Matt Lait, LAPD Misconduct Cases Rarely Resulted
in Charges, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 2000, at Al (reporting that Los Angeles
prosecutors routinely failed to charge LAPD officers with crimes, often in spite
of "substantial evidence of their guilt'); Lindner, supra note 27; Editorial,
Make the Law Obey Laws, L.A. TIMES, Oct 30, 2000, at B6 (asserting that po-
lice corruption uncovered by Rampart scandal and federal civil rights investi-
gators "is the direct consequence of long-standing failures of local police and
prosecutors").
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the law.35 Once again, we have met the enemy and it is us-or at
least some of us.
36
Does it have to be this way? Can we do anything to change it?
And--to return to my specific topic-do feminist legal theories offer
insights, strategies, explanations, or justifications for change that can
help deconstruct and dismantle the culture of police abuse? De-
fending the police for using pepper spray and pellets to disperse un-
ruly demonstrators during the 2000 Democratic National Convention
in Los Angeles, the officer in charge demanded, "What would you
do, call in the Girl Scouts? '37 As this Essay will demonstrate, my
answer is yes.
The first Part of the Essay describes five major types of feminist
legal theory and two variants38 that may provide guidance in
35. See Symposium, Police Violence: Causes and Cures, 7 J.L. & POL'Y
77, 85-86 (1998) (remarks of Paul G. Chevigny); see also CHEMERINSKY
REPORT, supra note 24, at 36 ("The public creates additional corrupting dy-
namics by assigning police sisyphean missions and demanding measurable re-
sults."); PAUL G. CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAS 7, 10-11 (1995) (commenting that police work both reflects and re-
shapes social order); cf Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, Rampart Shadows Mayoral
Candidates, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, at MI (reporting that many Los Angeles
residents "have not been directly affected by Rampart, let alone enraged by it.
They don't care how drug dealers or gang members get put in jail, as long as
they stay there.").
36. This line is, of course, paraphrased from cartoonist Walt Kelly's Pogo.
The original, "We have met the enemy and he is us," referred to environmental
pollution. See Walt Kelly, at http://www.bpib.con/kelly.htm (last visited Oct.
23, 2000).
37. Beth Shuster & Jim Newton, Campaign 2000: LAPD's Response to
Protests Shows Its Strength and, Critics Say, Its Faults, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16,
2000, at Al (quoting the police commander in charge of LAPD's convention
planning unit).
38. These categories and short descriptions inevitably fail to capture the
depth, variety, and complexity of feminist legal theory. The most notable gap
is the absence of lesbian feminist theory, even though it may be especially
relevant in the context of analyzing police conduct and misconduct. See
MILLER, supra note 1, at 9-10 (stating that a "significant number" of eighteen
women neighborhood police officers in her study of an anonymous police de-
partment "were 'out' lesbians"); id. at 222-23 (finding that community policing
may attract lesbians because it provides "flexibility" and departs from "estab-
lished macho heterosexual police culture"); see also Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian
Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 43, 70-71 (1994) (urging the development and recognition of les-
bian legal theory). Nonetheless, a complete taxonomy of legal feminism is far
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response to police misconduct. The second Part provides a brief
historical description of police misconduct, police culture, and po-
licewomen in Los Angeles. The third Part examines each feminist
legal theory's possible justifications for transforming the job of law
enforcement and applies them to the most obvious feminist solution:
hiring women to serve as police officers. In conclusion, I sketch,
very briefly, what feminist policing or law enforcement might look
like, even when both sexes are doing it, and suggest that it would not
only discourage violence, abuse, and corruption but make our com-
munities safer, more equal, and more free.
I. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORIES
Feminist legal theory divides, not always neatly, into five pri-
mary strands that I shall call liberal, cultural, radical, postmodern,
and critical race feminism 39 Liberal feminism, the most familiar,
took the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s as both its
theoretical model and its practical guide, defining sex discrimination
as analogous to race discrimination and sex equality as decision-
making without regard to sex, analogous to color-blindness in racial
equal protection theory. Liberal feminism produced the failed at-
tempt to enact a federal Equal Rights Amendment.40 Its theory and
practice are also exemplified by the Women's Rights Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union, which flourished in the 1970s under
the leadership of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and first persuaded the Su-
preme Court of the United States that sex-based discrimination un-
justly perpetuates harmful gender stereotypes and violates constitu-
tional guarantees of equal protection.
41 The original or "classical" 42
beyond the scope of this Essay. For one of my earlier, partial attempts, see
Mary Ellen Gale, Unfinished Women: The Supreme Court and the Incomplete
Transformation of Women's Rights in the United States, 9 WHrITiER L. REV.
445 (1987) (commenting that feminist controversies over theoretical models to
resolve three 1987 Supreme Court cases on employment discrimination illumi-
nate inadequacies of liberal feminism to identify, oppose, and remedy sex dis-
crimination).
39. For a similar, though not identical, method of ordering feminist legal
theories, see GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 128-48 (1995).
40. See generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986)
(describing the background of the ERA).
41. See David Cole, Are You Now or Have You Ever Been a Member of the
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liberal feminists seek formal equality with men, nothing less but sel-
dom much more. They sometimes define "more" as "different,"
"different" as "special," and "special treatment" under law as an icy
descent down the slippery slope from the hard-won and easily lost
plateau of formal equality into the valley of discrimination from
which the climb began. 43 They support affirmative action when it
means outreach, equal opportunities, and even some modest restruc-
turing of male-gendered institutions, especially in public and private
employment, 44 but they at least provisionally accept many existing
cultural norms and legal standards-even if those standards were de-
signed by men for men. When Justice Ginsburg ruled on behalf of
the Court that the Virginia Military Institute should open its doors to
women students generally on the same terms as men, with a few ac-
commodations to satisfy conventional concerns about physical pri-
vacy,45 she spoke from within the classical liberal feminist tradition,
de-emphasizing both biological and cultural differences between
ACLU?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1404, 1409 (1992) ("[T]he ACLU Women's Rights
Project almost single-handedly developed the constitutional law of gender dis-
crimination under the leadership of Ruth Bader Ginsburg."); Mary Ellen Gale
& Nadine Strossen, The Real ACLU, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161, 164-66
(1989) (giving a narrative of how the ACLU supported women's rights).
42. See Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phe-
nomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149,
151 n.3 (2000) (describing this strand of theory as "classical, liberal-legal
feminism"').
43. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on
Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 151, 170 (1992)
(arguing that "special benefits for pregnant women" are dangerous to women's
equality, and adding that, "[i]f we can't have it both ways, we need to think
carefully about which way we want to have it"); see also Joan Williams, Do
Women Need Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need Equality?, 9 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssUEs 279, 296 (1998) (noting that few or no feminists have ever ad-
vocated nothing but formal equality); id. at 319 ("the special treatment debate
... deteriorated into a gender war," in which feminist adversaries too often
obscured their own agreements); cf id. at 280 (asking if feminists should re-
consider whether to abandon "equality rhetoric.., in a culture where equality
and rights talk are the accepted rhetorics for translating moral claims into legal
ones").
44. See Joan Williams, supra note 43, at 299 (discussing how the writings
of both Wendy Williams and now-Justice Ginsburg demonstrate their "com-
mit[ment] to deconstructing male norms" and their support of affirmative ac-
tion for women).
45. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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women and men in recognition of their common humanity and their
common right to equal education and employment opportunities.46
A second set of liberal feminists argues that formal equality-
even the imperfect gender symmetry that most of the first group
would probably accept-cannot suffice in all circumstances. These
"difference" feminists reject gender-blindness as either a
methodology or a goal Because women are biologically and
culturally different from men, because, most important, only women
undergo pregnancy and give birth to children, and women more often
than men serve as the primary caregivers for children, true equality
in the home, the workplace, and the world must take account of the
reality of women's lives to ensure gender justice. Although liberal
difference feminists vary as to how many sex- and gender-based
differences they believe the law should accommodate, and what
criteria should be used to identify them,47 they have moved
decisively beyond the simple notion that sex equality in general
demands no more than compensating for past discrimination and
making jobs, educational opportunities, and other social goods
available to women who demonstrate the qualifications and
characteristics required of men. When Justice Thurgood Marshall
46. Nonetheless, she observed for the Court that, "Sex classifications may
be used to compensate women for particular economic disabilities they have
suffered, to promote equal employment opportunity, [and] to advance full de-
velopment of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people." Id. at 533 (in-
ternal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). This plainly goes be-
yond formal equality, in recognition of past and continuing harms of gender
discrimination. Cf Mary Anne C. Case, "The Ver.y Stereotype the Lmv Con-
demns " Constitutional Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85
CORMELL L. REv. 1447, 1461 (2000) (pointing out that this language raises the
question "what limits, if any, there are on the use of discrimination as a proxy
to justify compensatory or affrmative action schemes for women").
47. Compare Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Preg-
nancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 26-31, 34 (1985) (addressing biological
differences only), with Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equali.,,
75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1296-97 (1987) (describing cultural as well as biologi-
cal differences, and noting that "the distinction between biological and cultural
... is itself culturally based"). Robin West, whose cultural or relational femi-
nist views also reflect the second form of liberal feminism, would revise the
law more broadly and deeply to account for women's different "subjective, he-
donic lives," including not just the central, relational experiences of pregnancy
and child-nurturing, but also uniquely female forms of suffering and pleasure.
See West, supra note 42, at 149-50, 162-64, 176, 180, 209-15.
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ruled for the Court that California employment laws could single out
"pregnant workers" for job protection not offered to nonpregnant
workers,48 he spoke for this second version of liberal feminism, one
that takes account of at least some differences between women and
men in order to remove barriers to substantive equality.
Cultural or relational feminism builds still further on the ac-
knowledgment of distinctions between men and women, often be-
ginning with psychologist Carol Gilligan's influential though contro-
versial insight and argument that the moral development of girls and
boys is strongly gendered and often may be fundamentally differ-
ent.49 While boys becoming men usually learn an ethic of justice
based on hierarchical principles and abstract, individual rights, she
suggests, girls becoming women embrace an ethic of caring and con-
nection among human beings, to weave and to reinforce the web of
personal relationships that constructs our private and public lives.50
Cultural feminists value this "different voice" of women, whom they
see as "more nurturing, caring, loving, and responsible" than men.
5'
They argue that neither liberal nor radical feminism can seriously
challenge patriarchy because neither offers an alternative set of val-
ues to displace it.52 In response to the criticism that cultural femi-
nism mistakes socially constructed gender differences for essential
48. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)
(holding that a California statute protecting jobs for four months of pregnancy-
based disability leave, but not for other disability leaves, does not violate Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
49. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). On the empirical and theo-
retical controversy over Gilligan's work, see CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN,
DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 76-92, 98
(1988) (reviewing research on gender and personality and stating that "intel-
lectual capacity and emotional qualities are distributed through humanity with-
out restrictions of sex"); MINDA, supra note 39, at 137; Deborah L. Rhode, The
"No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100
YALE L.J. 1731, 1786-88 (1991).
50. See, e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 49, at 24-32, 38-39, 47-49, 151-59.
51. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 13-14
(1988).
52. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substan-
tive Feminism, U. CHI. LEGAL F., 1999, at 21, 21 (discussing generally the
notion that patriarchy will not be displaced until an alternate value system is
offered).
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biological realities, they reply that their account "resonates with
many women. '5 3 They question whether liberal feminists have
missed the point that fundamental social change is necessary to en-
sure that equality means something more than assimilation into a
culture constructed to perpetuate male prerogatives and perspectives,
and whether radical feminists have been too ready to discount what
women's voices say now in focusing on what they might say in some
problematic future when gender equality has been achieved. Cultural
feminists seek to develop "a female-centered counterculture '54 that
supplements or even replaces the liberal-legal construction of indi-
vidual but depersonalized rights with a legal order that listens to
women's voices and heeds the ways in which women's values may
differ from those of men.
Some cultural feminists also rely on another recent development
in legal theory, narratives of real and imagined personal experiences
that exemplify and illuminate the myriad forms that discrimination
based on race, sex, or race-and-sex may assume in everyday life, the
depth and variety of the harms it inflicts, and the wide array of re-
sponses it engenders in those who suffer it.55 Because the dominant
account-the official story-of law is profoundly and uncompro-
misingly male, they contend, narrative jurisprudence provides a cor-
rective: the unofficial story about what really happens to women and
how they think and feel about it.56 Though no modem Supreme
Court decision reflects the views of cultural feminists and few or
none of them would endorse older rulings that both sheltered and
imprisoned women as "the center of home and family life," 57 their
voice can be heard along with liberal feminists seeking renewed and
deeper legal recognition and respect for some of the traditionally
53. Id. at 40.
54. MIDA supra note 39, at 135.
55. See id. at 155-56, 160-61; Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories,
79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991); Richard Delgado, Sioytelfing for Oppositionists
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Symposium,
Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989).
56. See West, supra note 42, at 158.
57. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (holding that a state may limit
women's jury service to affirmative volunteers even though it automatically
places men on jury lists). The Hoyt decision was described in the more recent
case of United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 560 (1996), as an example of
"now abandoned view[s]."
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gendered roles of women, especially the care and nurture of chil-
dren.58 More softly but ominously, in reductive and regressive tones
that most cultural feminists probably would reject, this voice also
registers in some of the Court's assumptions, deeply stereotypic and
occasionally counterfactual, about the ways in which being a woman
is different from being a man. 59
Radical or dominance feminism rejects both the classical liberal
feminist claim that sex discrimination is merely the irrational con-
tinuation of outdated prejudices and the cultural feminist claim that
women, by nature or by nurture, are the guardians of human relation-
ships. Radical feminists see a world of intentional, hierarchical, rig-
idly structured, and self-reinforcing male domination and entitle-
ment, characterized by the violent, hostile, sexualized, and
systematic social and economic subordination of women to and by
men.60  Radical feminists like Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin argue that law, along with other cultural forces, is deeply
58. See MINDA, supra note 39, at 137.
59. E.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 77 (1981) (excluding women
from military draft does not violate equal protection partly because excluding
women from military combat is a "fundamental" principle in American life);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 467 (1981) (punishing only men
for statutory rape does not violate equal protection because only men can cause
pregnancy and only women can get pregnant; risk of pregnancy is a natural
deterrent to teen-age sexual intercourse that makes legal deterrent unneces-
sary); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (holding that the
government may exclude pregnancy-related disability from otherwise compre-
hensive employee benefits plan because pregnancy is not a sex-based classifi-
cation). Women were excluded from combat based on cultural stereotype, not
principle. The statements that only men can cause pregnancy, and that preg-
nancy is unrelated (or unimportantly related) to sexual identity and sex dis-
crimination, are simply and obviously wrong. Although the Court's observa-
tions arise from and reinforce a prefeminist or antifeminist conception of
women as incomplete men, the cultural feminist description of women as fun-
damentally different from men because of linked biological and cultural differ-
ences retrospectively lends this skewed jurisprudence a conditional legitimacy.
Cf Wendy W. Williams, supra note 43, at 151 (arguing that because judicial
authority is limited to case review, "women's equality as delivered by the
courts can only be an integration into a pre-existing, predominantly male
world"); id. at 155-66 (discussing the cases from a liberal feminist perspec-
tive).
60. See ALLISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 83-
122, 249-302 (1988) (discussing, respectively, radical feminist conceptions of
human nature and the politics of radical feminism).
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gendered to perpetuate male power and female servility. Men use
law to hurt women. Their law constructs and constricts women as
sexual objects, forces them into submission, and then treats submis-
sion as proof of inferiority and refuses to respect them as moral
agents, the subjects of their own lives.61 Because radical feminists
perceive gender as primarily a question of power and politics, of sex
inequality and sexual oppression rather than sex difference, 62 they
seek new conceptions of law to redistribute power, to end male
domination, and thereby to ensure women's equality, freeing women
to discover, for the first time, an independent destiny and a voice of
their own.63 But the voice that radical feminists expect to hear is not
that of the cultural feminists. To affirm sex difference under condi-
tions of male dominance, MacKinnon argues, is "to affirm the quali-
ties and characteristics of powerlessness." 64 The morality of caring
and connectedness is neither innate nor chosen, she argues, but im-
posed by the pervasive system of sex inequality. "Women value care
because men have valued us according to the care we give them ....
Women think in relational terms because our existence is defined in
relation to men."' 65 We will discover women's true voice, MacKin-
non asserts, only when we lift men's feet from our necks, rise, and
speak at last for ourselves.66
61. See ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN
(1989); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON
LIFE AND LAW (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED];
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE].
62. See MAcKNNON, FEMNIsM UNMODIFIED, supra note 61, at 35-36, 40-
45; MAcKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 61, at 218-19,
237-43.
63. See MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 61, at
244-49.
64. MAcKINNON, FEMINIsM UNMODIFIED, supra note 61, at 39.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 45. In using the line, "Take your foot off our necks, and then
we will hear in what tongue women speak," MacKinnon paraphrases an 1837
letter from an early feminist abolitionist. The original line read, "I ask no fa-
vors for my sex .... All I ask of our brethren is, that they will take their feet
from off our necks." SARAH GRIMKE, LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE
SEXES AND THE CONDITION OF WOMAN: ADDRESSED TO MARY S. PARKER,
PRESIDENT OF THE BOSTON FEMALE ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 10 (1970),
quoted in Mary Becker, 21e Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts:
An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 209, 241
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Radical feminist theory and its correlative attempt to destroy the
hierarchy of gender seem far removed from the cautious constitu-
tional and statutory jurisprudence of equal protection and antidis-
crimination law. Nonetheless its legal initiatives include one impor-
tant, though shared, victory. Feminists of all types joined to
persuade courts and legislatures throughout the nation to take sexual
harassment seriously as a form of sex discrimination in employment
and education. Although the major Supreme Court decisions are
written in the familiar terminology of liberal law, 67 they echo, how-
ever faintly, the radical feminist critique of gendered power and the
many ways it works to disadvantage and dispossess women, not only
of jobs and education, but of identity, status, and self-respect. The
radical feminists' other primary legal initiative has been less success-
ful. Lower courts invalidated, as unconstitutional censorship,
MacKinnon and Dworkin's proposed antipomography ordinance,
which defined a wide range of sexually explicit words and images as
prohibited sex discrimination that in certain circumstances entitled a
defined class of victims to civil remedies.68 The courts found the or-
dinance unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and accepted the
n.246 (1998).
67. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (ruling
that a school board's deliberate indifference and failure to remedy severe stu-
dent-on-student sexual harassment may violate federal antidiscrimination
laws); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (holding that em-
ployer may be vicariously liable for negligently failing to prevent sexual har-
assment); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (issuing a
similar holding as above); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S.
75 (1998) (finding that same-sex sexual harassment may violate federal em-
ployment discrimination laws); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)
(concluding that sexual harassment that creates an objectively hostile work en-
vironment, subjectively so perceived by the victim, is a form of sex discrimi-
nation even if it does not cause serious psychological harm); Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (ruling that sexual harassment that creates
hostile work environment may constitute illegal sex discrimination).
68. See Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
ajf'g 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (holding Indianapolis ordinance un-
constitutional). It seems that no other governmental entity in the United States
enacted the proposed antipornography ordinance, though it took the mayor's
veto twice to defeat the original and a revision in Minneapolis. See Paul Brest
& Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-
Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607, 644-45, 653
(1987).
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arguments of liberal feminists that freedom of erotic expression, at
least in words and pictures, even if it contributes significantly to fe-
male subordination, not only protects liberty for everyone but better
serves gender equality.69 MacKinnon's reply was to continue her
critical attack on liberal ways of thinking about free expression.
"Law is only words," she wrote, "yet we do not analyze law as the
mere expression of ideas .... It makes no more sense to treat por-
nography as mere abstraction and representation than it does to treat
law as simulation or fantasy., 70 She called for "a new model for
freedom of expression in which the free speech position no longer
supports social dominance"--like that exerted by Nazis, Klansmen,
pornographers--',hile doing nothing for their victims.' ,7'
Postmodem or eclectic legal feminism rejects what its adherents
consider to be the innate, reductionist essentialism of most other ver-
sions of feminism--the almost inescapable urge to tell one primary
story of gender injustice, to universalize the multiple, complex, sub-
tly nuanced, and richly varied experiences of women. Postmodem
legal feminists perceive both equality and gender not as objective,
fixed, and determinate but as contextual, subjective, contingent,
shifting, and uncertain.72 They focus on language-and legal lan-
guage in particular-as a primary means of constructing social real-
ity. Gender itself is socially constructed and individually experi-
enced from moment to moment, as part of the uneven flow of
individual consciousness, despite the perverse consistency of gender
role expectations. Gender is performance rather than essence.73 It is
subject to linguistic and legal deconstruction--to self-contradictory,
liberating, even defiant analysis that exposes its ideological basis and
bias.74 Narrative jurisprudence is important for postmodem legal
69. See Lisa Duggan et al., False Promises: Feminist Anti-Pornography
Legislation in the U.S., in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP 130 (Varda Burstyn
ed., 1985). My description of this feminist split is intended to be neutral, or at
least fair. This Essay is not the place to re-examine it.
70. CATHARINE A. MAcKiNNoN, ONLY WORDS 40 (1993).
71. Id. at 109.
72. See FRUG, supra note 12; MINDA, supra note 39, at 141-47; Mary Joe
Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1045
(1992).
73. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 1, at 66 ("The sociological term 'doing
gender' describes the activity of practicing such [gendered] behavior.").
74. See Williams, supra note 10, at 1567-68.
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feminists because it illustrates the infinite variety of women's lives
and voices and the sometimes provisional, improvised, and paradoxi-
cal nature of their multiple identities and unstable selves,7 5 not be-
cause it generates a unified feminist theory or a transcendent expla-
nation for women's oppression. For postmodernists, there is no such
explanation, no single theory of what it means to be a woman.
Similarly, there is no single theory of what it means to be a man.
The exploration of "multiple truths and splintered subjectivities
76
extends to men as well as women. Because men also have plural,
unstable identities and gender anxieties based on social hierarchies of
race, class, and sexual orientation, among other variables, there are
multiple "masculinities" as well.77 Some postmodern feminists ac-
cept the sociological argument that violence and criminality strongly
correlate with biological and cultural maleness partly because of
"power struggles among men" that encourage the winners to assert
their dominance at the expense of the losers, who in turn seek other
ways to re-establish their manliness, to prove that they are not
women. 78  Nonetheless, postmodernists share the belief of other
feminists that women's interests, rights, needs, and values too often
have been omitted from the social, political, and legal conversations
that shape our lives--that it is necessary to resist male dominance di-
rectly, as well as its psychological and sociological origins. The goal
of postmodem legal feminists is to end gender oppression through
social and legal reconstructions that respect differences among
women and men as well as between women and men, to encourage
pluralistic conceptions of gender and equality .that diminish male he-
gemony and increase female autonomy, while acknowledging the
open-ended indeterminacy of the quest. Because of its emphasis on
particularity and discontinuity, postmodern legal feminism does not
readily translate into a coherent strategy for legal change, but it of-
fers support for litigation and legislation that further equality and
75. See john a. powell, The Multiple Self Exploring Between and Beyond
Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1483-84 (1997) (writ-
ing that the self is composed of multiple, fragmented, and shifting identities).
76. Anne C. Dailey, Feminism 's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265,
1266 (1993).
77. See Harris, supra note 1, at 782-84.
78. See id. at 783.
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self-determination based on the complexity and variety of women's
lives.
Critical race feminism combines feminism with critical race
theory, which emerged in the 1980s to challenge liberal theories of
racism and civil rights by focusing on the persistence and pervasive-
ness of race discrimination.79 Critical race theorists reject both the
goal of formal equality and the methodology of racially neutral deci-
sion-making, arguing that the deep structure of American society is
so implacably racist and racialized that alleged color-blindness and
neutral meritocracy perpetuate the white privilege and racial oppres-
sion they ostensibly counteract 0 Critical race theorists value story-
telling and narrative scholarship as one powerful way to communi-
cate how racism and white supremacy continue to shape the lives of
people of color, to record their resistance and validate their perspec-
tives, to create new legal strategies, and to continue the search for ra-
cial justice. 81 Critical race feminists explore the ways that race, sex,
and class combine to form crucial determinants of identity and expe-
rience, and change the face and nature of gender discrimination and
male supremacy. 2 Though allied in many respects with postmodem
79. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CrTING EDGE
(Richard Delgado ed., 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY]; MINDA,
supra note 39, at 167-85; Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal
Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space,
81 CAL. L. REv. 1241 (1993); Crenshaw, supra note 3; Peggy C. Davis, Law
as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence l, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); john
a. powell, RacialRealism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L. REv. 533 (1992).
80. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the
Law: How "Color-Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social
Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000).
81. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 79, at xiii-xv; Delgado, supra
note 55, at 2415-16.
82. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anit'ray? Feminist and
Antiracist Appropriations ofAnita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING
POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); Paulette
M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gen-
der, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365; Kiniberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersec-
January 2001]
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
feminists in their insistence on multiple voices and outsider narra-
tives as revelatory of the real world and of the changes necessary for
women to flourish in it, critical race feminists argue that other femi-
nists too often disregard or barely recognize the racial and ethnic
consciousness and the unconscious racism of the social construction
of gender discrimination and gender itself.
83
Despite its academic origins, critical race feminism is grounded
in insight and analysis based on feminist legal practice, 84 and has
made two significant, interconnected contributions to antidiscrimi-
nation law. Its proponents exposed the racism in judicial rulings that
women of color (unlike white women, whom some judges seemed to
consider race-less) could not properly represent the biological and
legal class of women. They also pointed out another obvious truth
that some courts resist, that employers and others may discriminate
along two vectors at once. For example, women of color may suffer
intersectional or multidimensional harms different from those in-
flicted on white women or racial minority men and therefore can be a
cognizable class for the purpose of identifying and remedying dis-
crimination. 85
tion of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doc-
trine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, U. CHI. LEGAL F., 1989, at 139
[hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection]; Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990); Jennifer M. Russell, On Being a Gorilla in Your Midst, or, The Life of
One Blackwoman in the Legal Academy, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 259
(1993).
83. E.g., Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra note 82, at 67
("The value of feminist theory to Black women is diminished because it
evolves from a white racial context that is seldom acknowledged .... [T]heir
exclusion is reinforced when white women speak for and as women."); see
Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Dis-
tinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1864 (1990);
Lawrence, supra note 79.
84. E.g., Caldwell, supra note 82; Crenshaw, supra note 82; White, supra
note 20.
85. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 82, at 368, 371 (noting that employment
discrimination decisions are often based on the unarticulated "premise that,
although racism and sexism share much in common, they are nonetheless fun-
damentally unrelated phenomena-a proposition proved false by history and
contemporary reality"); Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra
note 82, at 58-66 (analyzing cases). The difference between the terms
"intersectional" and "multidimensional" is subtle; some theorists use the latter
to describe the lived experience of combined but inseparable racial, biological,
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Critical race theory has generated another new category of legal
scholarship known as "critical white studies," which focuses on
white supremacy and privilege as a "social organizing principle"
86
and seeks, more consciously and skeptically than classical liberal
scholarship and without its allegiance to formal neutrality, to dis-
mantle them and to construct in their place an "antiracist white iden-
tity.'8 7  Critical white feminism explores ways in which white
women can ally with racial and ethnic minorities to oppose racial and
sexual oppression and inequality without, however inadvertently, ap-
propriating or displacing minority perspectives, or replicating part of
the dominant white male discourse. Because that discourse simulta-
neously privileges white women because they are white and subordi-
nates white women because they are women,88 white women have a
double, contradictory, almost deconstructive89 relationship with the
world of white male privilege. The dominant message is to stay in
the game, because white women share some of the benefits of socie-
tal racism, and the subordinate, contradictory message is to end the
and sexual identities. See Harris, supra note 1, at 782 n.23. Susan L. Miller's
sociological research confirms this experience in practice for some lesbian po-
licewomen. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 134-36 (observing that sexual ori-
entation combined with race and gender to influence their approach to police
work).
86. CRTICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 79, at 541. See generalli
CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado
& Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
87. Barbara J. Flagg, Changing the Rules: Some Prelimina. Thoughts on
Doctrinal Reform, Indeterminacy, and Whiteness, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
250, 250 (1996); see Collin O'Connor Udell, Stalking the Wild Lacuna: Com-
munication, Cognition and Contingency, 16 LAW & INEQ. 493, 511-12 (1998).
88. See Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, in Practice and The-
ory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 233-44
(1993) (arguing that racist society affects all of us, and that the invisibility of
privilege to the privileged prevents most white feminists from giving the same
depth of thought to their race as they have to their gender); id. at 247-48 (as-
serting that the meaning of whiteness must be made visible in order to chal-
lenge it).
89. This is not quite deconstructive because the second message is not
contained within, but merely, though ineluctably, accompanies the first. The
"dangerous supplement" in deconstructive theory inverts or displaces the hier-
archy of thought represented by the statement or text itself. See Jack M.
Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 747,
755-64, 786 (1987) (explaining French philosopher Jacques Derrida's theory
of textual interpretation).
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game, or call it into serious question, because white women carry
some of the burdens of societal sexism. Critical white feminism asks
white women, especially feminists, to reconsider their divided situa-
tion, to evaluate even their feminist theories and actions to ensure
that they oppose rather than accept or support injustices based on
race and class that primarily harm other women.
Despite their differences, all of the feminist legal theories de-
scribed above can offer at least a provisional analysis of police mis-
conduct and can suggest remedial actions. Because police miscon-
duct appears to be either caused by or substantially aggravated by the
police culture of hypermasculinity 9° with which it correlates, the
most obvious solution is to de-gender or re-gender police work fe-
male as well as male and assign it to women as well as to men.9'
Because biological sex strongly predicts cultural and behavioral gen-
der for individuals, the most obvious way to re-gender police work is
to hire more women officers and promote them to positions of lead-
ership.92 However, since each theory has its own perspective, femi-
nists of different types may support this recommendation in different
ways, respond with varying degrees of urgency, suggest different ap-
proaches, or provide different justifications. Nonetheless, differ-
ences in theory and perspective do not tell the whole story. Even if
the postmodern insight into our contingent and shifting identities is
correct, even if we cannot universalize women's experiences or dis-
cover neutral and permanent truths about the intersections of race,
class, and sex in social and legal systems, the multiple stories we tell
may converge in shared strategies for change. "Transformative
work, which is... the point of feminist struggle, involves listening
90. For a definition of hypermasculinity, see supra note 31.
91. However, at least one city police force that seriously experimented with
nontraditional policing found it more expedient to re-gender traditionally fe-
male skills and activities as male. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 214-15. This
approach, despite its short-term practical advantages, reinforces male suprem-
acy instead of challenging it.
92. But see Case, supra note 1, at 93. Case argues that it is a "facile mis-
take... to essentialize the female as feminine" and therefore to conclude that
making the police force more female is either necessary or sufficient to make it
more feminine. Even if feminine traits like "sensitivity" and "empathy" are
required, some men will have them and some women will not, as federal em-
ployment discrimination cases have recognized. Id. at 93-94 & n.326 (citing
the cases that support this notion).
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respectflully to those who see what we cannot."93 It requires us to
build a "narrative bridge, 94 between ourselves and other women, to
imagine their lives as well as our own, and to stand together in the
many places where we can find common ground.9
II. POLICE CULTURE, POLICE MISCONDUCT, AND POLICE WOMEN
The history of police misconduct in Los Angeles now stretches
over more than a century. It began with the divided public ideology
and culture of Los Angeles in the late 1800s and early 1900s, for-
mally rigid and puritanical, informally licentious and criminal, and
the police force that the city's leaders created to enforce the laws
they often chose to disobey. 96 From its founding in 1877, the police
department and its officers were expected to act "as thuggish enforc-
ers of the rich man's laws,",97 especially against racial and ethnic mi-
norities. Many policemen augmented their low salaries with payoffs
from criminals and gangsters who also financed local politicians.98
Local businessmen fought the unions during a twenty-year strike
from 1890 to 1910, when two workers bombed the printing plant of
the Los Angeles Times, killing twenty-one employees, demoralizing
the labor movement, and plunging the police department "unequivo-
cally, passionately, and irrevocably in the business of spying, sur-
veillance, and repression ' 99 that has characterized it ever since.
The history of women police officers in Los Angeles extends
back nearly as far. One month before the Los Angeles Times
bombing, Alice Stebbins Wells, a social worker with a theological
education and a missionary zeal, joined the Los Angeles Police
93. Mahoney, supra note 88, at 248.
94. Dailey, supra note 76, at 1273.
95. See id. at 1278-85. Dailey argues that the feminist commitment to
"community across diversity" can reconstitute an "empathetic liberalism" from
the many different voices of feminism. "Through narrative, the feminist vision
of human connection offers liberalism the possibility of political union built
upon bonds deeper than self-interest." Id. at 1283.
96. See JOE DOMANICK, To PROTECT AND To SERVE: THE LAPD's
CENTURY OF WAR IN THE CITY OF DREAMS 33-34 (1994) (discussing the
LAPD's pervasive policing and its remarkable autonomy, power, and ability to
silence critics).
97. Id. at34.
98. See id. at 34-35.
99. Id. at38-39.
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Department as the first woman police officer in the United States.100
Her political campaign for the job-which required enactment of a
special city ordinance permitting "the employment of one police of-
ficer who shall be a woman" 0 1-was cultural feminism in practice,
an attitude that would prevail for years, separating women police of-
ficers from the perceived primary tasks of law enforcement but also
empowering them to demonstrate that there might be another way to
enforce the law. 10 2  Women, she argued, were natural experts in
crime prevention, especially among women; they would know better
than men how to prevent women and children from committing
crimes and to protect them from becoming victims of crime. 10 3 As-
signed to the Juvenile Bureau, she remained there for nearly thirty
years.' 0 4 Although she instantly became a minor national celebrity,
traveling throughout the United States and Canada to urge other cit-
ies to hire women officers, 0 5 she is not even mentioned in one of the
best-known biographies of the Los Angeles Police Department,
10 6
perhaps partly because, to some extent, she represents a mission that
failed.
Until the 1930s policewomen emphasized social work and crime
prevention, acting as "municipal mothers" and rejecting male police
work as irrelevant, even antithetical, to their job. 10 7 Organized into
100. See APPIER, supra note 1, at 10; MILLER, supra note 1, at 76. In re-
sponse to pressure from African American women's groups, in 1916 the LAPD
also hired the first black policewoman in the United States, Georgia Ann
Robinson. Her primary job was to help African American women and chil-
dren, with special focus on resisting sexual exploitation. See APPIER, supra
note 1, at 127-28.
101. APPIER, supra note 1, at 10.
102. See id. at 46-57.
103. See id. at 9.
104. See id. at 108.
105. See id. at 10.
106. See DOMANICK, supra note 96. Women in the LAPD are mentioned
rarely, on less than ten of his 439 pages of text, usually as the subject of male
derision and complaint. See id. at 9-10, 11-12, 290, 292, 304, 306.
107. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 76 (quoting D.M. SCHULZ, FROM SOCIAL
WORKER TO CRIMEFIGHTER: WOMEN IN UNITED STATES MUNICIPAL POLICING
4 (1995)). The LAPD established a Juvenile Bureau in 1909. See APPIER, su-
pra note 1, at 107. The Los Angeles City Council authorized a "City Mother's
Bureau" in 1914, primarily to protect immigrant and working class girls from
sexual exploitation and "misconduct" and to counsel them and their mothers.
See id. at 81-86; MILLER, supra note 1, at 80.
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separate women's bureaus, they "were removed from the male power
base of the police organization, with a negative impact on the scope
of their responsibilities, salaries, prestige, and opportunities for pro-
motion." 08 Nonetheless, despite publicly reassuring policemen that
women would not replace them, some early policewomen sought to
redirect police work "from a narrow concentration on detection and
arrest to a broad commitment to identifying and eliminating the
causes of crime" and "to extend the idealized female world of nur-
ture into the criminal justice system."'109 This mission collapsed after
1930,110 as police reformers emphasized crime control and sought to
professionalize police forces and discourage political and financial
corruption by instituting hierarchical bureaucracies and military-like
chains of command, and by isolating police from the communities in
which they worked."'
"Officers were expected to be detached, remote, [and] stoic,
conveying dispassionate objectivity."" 2  Policewomen's social
service activities were not part of the new model. Janis Appier, in
her historical study of women in the LAPD, observes, "Perhaps in no
other city in the United States did women police have a more prom-
ising start than Los Angeles, or, in retrospect, a more thorough de-
feat."
' 3
In the 1920s, "enlightened" police chiefs introduced modem
management and technology, formal education for police work, and
higher wages. "But ... no one questioned what might happen if the
... emphasis on training, and faceless paramilitary policing, along
with the ever-expanding power and independence of police depart-
ments from civilian control, was carried to its ultimate conclu-
sion.,," 4 In subordinating women, disdaining crime prevention, and
circumventing civilian government, the LAPD developed and un-
leashed a ferocious style of police work that defeated its own
108. MILER, supra note 1, at 82.
109. APPIER, supra note 1, at 56, 58.
110. See id. at 138.
111. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 78-79.
112. Id. at 79 (continuing with, "[n]ote that the only method devised to curb
corruption was to promote dehumanization; only when man is a machine can
he be free of vice").
113. APPIER, supra note 1, at 69.
114. DOMANICK, supra note 96, at 49.
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ostensible goals, engendering outlaws within the ranks of law en-
forcement. In the 1930s the department, acting on its own initiative,
illegally blockaded California's state borders, far from Los Angeles
and its geographic authority, to repel thousands of migrant workers.
In the city, the police force rounded up the homeless and deported
them out of state.115 By 1938 police violence and corruption led to
trials that disclosed massive police surveillance of any and all critics
of the LAPD. 116 After the end of World War II, the LAPD instituted
an Internal Affairs Division to investigate misconduct by police offi-
cers, and in 1950 the head of that unit, William H. Parker, was ap-
pointed Police Chief."1
7
During that same era, a second generation of women police offi-
cers joined the department. Rejecting the "social-worker identity" of
their predecessors, they sought to adapt to the male model of police
work, and were assigned to work in teams with veteran policemen
who often resented their presence, doubted their ability, and de-
meaned them as "unfeminine."" 8 Like classical liberal feminists,
they strove to meet male standards, acquiring uniforms, badges, and,
in 1939, guns. 119 But equality proved elusive.
"Ironically, the arming of policewomen illustrates their loss of
power. Because policewomen no longer sought to infuse police
work with the values associated with women and social work, they
no longer represented a threat to male hegemony."'' 20 Eager to con-
form and to be accepted, they failed to challenge the emerging
"crime control" model that, in Los Angeles and throughout the na-
tion, became the dominant mode of law enforcement in the United
States.121  Crime control "marginalized policewomen" because it
valued "aggression, dominance, physical strength, and toughness"-
115. See id. at60-61.
116. See id. at 77.
117. See id. at 99-100, 103.
118. See APPIERsupra note 1, at 156, 158.
119. See id. at 158-60. Appier notes that some "opposition to uniforms for
policewomen involved female gender identity. Police uniforms were and are a
universally understood symbol for the coercive power of the state over life,
liberty, and property." Id. at 63. Women in uniforms "challenged gender hier-
archy." Id.
120. Id. at 160.
121. See id. at 160-66; CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23,
at xiv.
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characteristics that crime controllers associated exclusively with
men. 122
During Chief Parker's sixteen-year command, he further mod-
ernized and militarized the LAPD, successfully insulated it from po-
litical accountability and control, encouraged its racism, and deep-
ened its isolation from the civilians it policed.12 As it became more
stridently masculine, the department excluded women from police
patrol, assigned them only to "tasks relating to women and children,
desk duty, and administration," and denied them promotion above
the rank of sergeant.' 24 It also refused to permit women officers to
arrest men.' 25 Reluctantly abandoning sex-segregated job classifica-
tions in 1973 after federal employment discrimination laws made
them unquestionably illegal, the department then imposed a physical
abilities test that excluded half of all women but only 2.6% of men
and height regulations that excluded 87% of all women but only 20%
of men. 26 In 1973 female Sergeant Fanchon Blake initiated seven
years of litigation that finally led to consent decrees requiring the
LAPD to increase the numbers of both women and racial minority
police officers.'
27
Since Parker's command, except for "brief interludes" including
the five-year term of Willie L. Williams in the mid-1990s, the LAPD
"has been run by three direct Parker descendants: Ed Davis, Daryl
Gates and Bernard Parks."'128 From 1965 to 1999 Los Angeles
122. APPIER, supra note 1, at 165-66; cf Case, supra note 1, at 71 (noting
that some employers disadvantage women employees "both for manifesting
and for failing to manifest stereotypically feminine behavior").
123. See DOMANICK, supra note 96, at 85-86, 103-16, 151-58.
124. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1979) (re-
versing a district court's summary judgment in favor of the police department).
The Ninth Circuit, in a decision written by Judge Shirley Hufstedler, held that
the LAPD's sex-segregated job classifications violated equal protection and
that the disparate impact of physical test and height regulations constituted a
prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended in 1972 to apply to state and local governments, set forth
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to-16 (2000).
125. See APPIER, supra note 1, at 168.
126. See Blake, 595 F.2d at 1374.
127. See APPIER, supra note 1, at 169. The decrees set goals at twenty per-
cent for women and representation equal to that in the Los Angeles work force
for minorities. See id.
128. McDermott, supra note 25. Parks, appointed in 1997 with the support
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experienced the Watts insurrection, the massive violations of privacy
disclosed by a police spying case in the 1980s,129 the Rodney King
beating, the Rampart scandal, and hundreds of other incidents, large
and small, both notorious and unremarked. 30 All of these combined
to display the department-despite the work of many dedicated and
responsible officers-as fundamentally hostile to civil rights and
civil liberties, to racial and ethnic minorities, to democratic account-
ability, and to the communities it purported to protect and to serve.
Some incidents led to investigations and recommendations,
which were seldom honored. "The cycle is so habitual that one
steadfast aspect of each new report is a section wondering why the
recommendations in past reports haven't been carried out."'' After
Watts "exploded in gunfire and flames" in August 1965, 32 the
McCone Commission issued a report' 33 that "was received with out-
rage" by many, including the California State Advisory Committee
to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, for its failure to
treat police misconduct and abuse as causative factors. 34 The report
recorded "severe criticism" of the LAPD, "a deep and longstanding
schism" between the police and "the Negro community," and
of reformers, reportedly has alienated the police force by inflexible disciplinary
regulations, yet failed to uncover the Rampart scandal prior to disclosures by
former officer Rafael Perez and others in 1999. See Cannon, supra note 27;
McDermott, supra note 25.
129. See DOMANICK, supra note 96, at 294-95 (noting that the LAPD had
been illegally spying on "everybody"-more than 200 individuals and organi-
zations, including governmental agencies like the Los Angeles City Council
and Police Commission and political, religious, civil rights, women's, and en-
vironmental groups); Jim Newton, LAPD Seeks New Rules for Undercover
Probes, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1996, at Al (reporting that the police sought to
end restrictions on intelligence gathering imposed by 1984 consent decree after
"explosive scandal over police spying").
130. See, e.g., DOMANICK, supra note 96, at 263-67, 270-77 (discussing the
LAPD's high occurrence of shootings involving unarmed civilians and its bi-
ased internal investigations); UNDERSTANDING THE RIOTS: Los ANGELES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE RODNEY KING CASE 15, 31, 37-42 (1992) [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING THE RIOTS]; McDermott, supra note 25.
131. McDermott, supra note 25; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23,
at 1, 25.
132. UNDERSTANDING THE RIOTS, supra note 130, at 9, 10, 21.
133. See VIOLENCE IN THE CITY, supra note 22.
134. DOMANICK, supra note 96, at 191.
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recurrent charges of police brutality,135 but rejected the suggestion
that a civilian review board be created to respond to complaints
against the police, instead proposing an outside inspector general'
36
This recommendation was not followed until five years after the
Christopher Commission made a similar recommendation in 1991.137
Not surprisingly in the 1960s, when crime control was the pri-
mary approach to law enforcement, and when women officers con-
stituted only a small fraction of city police forces and less than three
percent of the LAPD,138 the McCone Commission apparently never
considered the possibility that women police officers, or a less re-
lentlessly aggressive and masculine method of policing, might lower
the level of police abuse and civilian hostility. Indeed, the report ex-
hibited no sex or gender awareness at all. Just two years later, how-
ever, a Commission that was formed to examine relationships be-
tween police and the public throughout the United States urged local
departments to hire more women and racial minorities.13 9  The
135. VIOLENCE IN THE CITY, supra note 22, at 19; see CHIUSTOPHER
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 70.
136. See VIOLENCE IN THE CITY, supra note 22, at 20-21; cf REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 206, 301-07 (New
York Times Co. ed., 1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION REPORT] (dis-
cussing police brutality in predominantly African American neighborhoods
and its contribution to civil disorder). The National Advisory Commission,
chaired by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, noted that routine traffic stops by
police in Harlem, Watts, Newark, and Detroit flared into widespread violence
partly because "police have come to symbolize white power, white racism and
white repression," especially in black ghettoes. KERNER COMMISSION
REPORT, supra, at 206. The report acknowledged widespread complaints
about "police brutality" and "harassment," but found that "[t]he true extent of
excessive and unjustified use of force is difficult to determine." Id. at 302-03.
Nonetheless, the Kerner Commission was far more willing than the McCone
Commission to criticize white society and its institutions, including law en-
forcement, and to recommend significant reforms.
137. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at xx, 173-78;
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23, at 209.
138. Before 1971, the federal government did not publish statistics on the
number of police women nationally or by state or city. See APPIER, supra note
1, at 171 n.3. In 1970 the percentage of women officers in the LAPD wlas
2.62; in 1973 it was 2.15; and in 1976 it was 2.08. See Blake v. City of Los
Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1979).
139. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 85 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE
125 (1967))
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President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice began with the suggestion that women could do "planning
and research, training, intelligence, inspection, public information,
community relations," computer programming, laboratory analysis,
and legal work. 140 The Commission later backed into the broader
recommendation that "women should serve regularly in patrol, vice,
and investigative divisions," and eventually "assume administrative
responsibilities.'
' 41
The LAPD listened to little or no advice from others. As the
Christopher Commission rediscovered twenty-six years later, the
LAPD after Watts did nothing serious to change its ways, 142 unless
under duress from the courts. In July 1991 the Commission issued
its response to the violent arrest four months earlier of Rodney King,
the recipient of fifty-six baton blows and uncounted kicks in the
presence of twenty-seven law enforcement officers, all recorded on
videotape by a civilian none of them noticed, and played and re-
played on television screens around the world.'43 The Commission
concentrated its inquiry and its recommendations on police use of
excessive force.' 44 In contrast with its predecessors, the Christopher
Commission recognized the importance of race and sex discrimina-
tion in both police employment and police misconduct. 45 It found
"substantial progress in the hiring of racial minorities and women"
since the consent decrees a decade earlier, 146 but also reported that
minorities and women continued to occupy subordinate rather than
managerial positions and receive less desirable assignments. 147 Per-
vasive racism, sexism, and hostility to gays and lesbians, throughout
the department and in its police work, combined with the crime con-
trol model of law enforcement, helped perpetuate an organizational
culture that encouraged male domination, discourtesy, hostility,
140. Id. (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN.
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 125 (1967)).
141. Id. (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN.
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 125 (1967)).
142. See DOMANICK, supra note 96, at 192.
143. See UNDERSTANDING THE RIOTS, supra note 130, at 33.
144. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at ii.
145. See id. at 71, 81-92.
146. Id. at 71.
147. See id. at 82-83.
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discrimination, harassment, and violence. 48 Because "most female
officers use a style of policing that minimizes the use of excessive
force and inappropriate confrontations," the Commission pointedly
observed, "the continued existence of discrimination against female
officers can deprive the Department of specific skills, and thereby
contribute to the problem of excessive force."' 49 The data demon-
strated that women officers were far less likely than men to resort to
unnecessary violence. No woman ranked in the top 120 reported us-
ers of force, or in the top 132 officers with the largest number of
combined use-of-force reports, personnel complaints, and officer-
involved shootings.150 Women officers, 12.6% of the police force in
1990, were only 3.4% of those involved in major incidents that pro-
duced the eighty-three most serious lawsuits against the LAPD in the
four previous years, and only 3.7% of the 808 officers with the high-
est number of incidents.' 5'
Women officers were not praised or rewarded for this record of
nonviolent policing that threatened the LAPD's ingrained way of
life. The Commission found "widespread and strongly felt gender
bias.' 52 In a 1987 study, seventy percent of women officers re-
ported that they were not judged on ability, seventy-six percent were
subjected to sexist remarks, fifty-five percent had partners who told
them they were incompetent, and forty-three percent were confronted
with "lack of sensitivity to cultural/racial issues."' 53 Another study
reported that "male officers do not overtly refuse to work with fe-
males but rather use subtle [sic] tactics such as not talking to them in
the car or not providing them with information to help them learn the
job," and even, in many cases, "deliberately orchestrat[ing] a fight
... to see how a female probationer would 'handle herself."" 5 4 Un-
aware of or undeterred by research showing that women officers
148. See id. at 69-92.
149. Id. at 83.
150. See id. at 84.
151. See id. at71, 84.
152. Id. at 83.
153. Id. at 85 (quoting a 1987 internal affairs study by Dr. Martin Reiser re-
vealing perceptions of sworn personnel about the treatment of women and mi-
norities).
154. Id. at 86 (quoting 1987 study).
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throughout the nation perform as well as men, 155 many LAPD train-
ing officers, who partner new officers in their first year and thus play
a critical role in socializing them, "expressed concerns that female
officers were not as capable, effective, or trustworthy as their male
counterparts.'
156
The Commission concluded, however, that "male attitudes" and
"stereotypical role models in law enforcement"--not women offi-
cers-were the real problem.' 57 It strongly recommended that the
LAPD recruit more racial minorities and women, provide "active
leadership" and "cultural awareness training" to counteract racism,
sexism, and stereotypes, and to ensure that minorities and women
have "full and equal opportunity" to obtain coveted assignments and
attain "leadership positions."' 58 More generally, it urged the depart-
ment to "develop and employ tactics that emphasize containment and
control rather than confrontation and physical force," and "to foster
within the LAPD a different attitude toward the population it serves,
and to assist the public to gain greater trust in the Department.'
5 9
The Commission even dared to recommend that the LAPD adopt a
"community-based policing model" that "treats service to the public
and prevention of crime as the primary function of police in soci-
ety." ' 60  In short, the Commission asked for precisely what the
LAPD seemed most determined Los Angeles would never get: a
155. See id. at 88; MILLER, supra note 1, at 86 (recounting that data from six
major cities "showed that although male officers still questioned the effective-
ness of women and whether they could physically handle the job, these con-
cerns were not substantiated by performance evaluations").
156. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 86.
157. Id. at 88.
158. Id. at 91-92. In reply to these recommendations, Police Chief Daryl F.
Gates quoted the LAPD's affirmative action policy, which required uniform
application of a "merit principle," and stated that the LAPD's policy "is ... to
ensure that all reasonable and positive efforts are made to achieve a work force
which, at all levels, reflects parity with the sex/ethnic makeup of the City's ci-
vilian labor force" and to consider affirmative action in hiring, promotion, and
assignments. Since the March 1981 consent decrees, he reported, women offi-
cers had risen from 2.6% to 13.3% of the LAPD. DARYL F. GATES,
DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991) (response to
CLA Report Recommendation Number 1).
159. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 105.
160. Id. at 98.
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revival, in modem form, of the crime prevention model of police
work that the department had at first tolerated but then decisively
rejected when women offered it as a supplemental approach seventy-
five years before. Nonetheless, a women's advisory group followed
up the Commission's report with its own "blueprint for gender eq-
uity" including "less masculine and more feminine criteria" for hir-
ing and evaluating police officers, 161 and the Los Angeles City
Council passed a resolution urging the LAPD to set a goal of forty-
three percent women officers. 1
62
In an interview in 1991, Joseph Wambaugh, a fourteen-year vet-
eran of the LAPD and a successful author of fiction and nonfiction
books about police work, suggested that the city council had not
gone far enough. He recommended a woman police chief and a po-
lice force of "50% women or more" because "female cops can go a
long way toward helping to mitigate the super-aggressive, paramili-
tary macho myth of the gung-ho cop and introducing the sobering
element of maturity in police work.' 63 Women, he said, can reveal
and discuss their emotions in a way that men, especially young men,
cannot. By acknowledging the fear that accompanies physical dan-
ger, women police officers accept it without shame or bravado. Be-
cause "they don't need to whip on somebody because he scared
them' and are more willing "to back off and wait for help" instead of
saving face by busting heads, they can set an example of calm, con-
sidered, and compassionate response 64 that men can learn, however
slowly, to follow. "Police work," Wambaugh said, "is not about
physical altercations... [or] about shooting people .... It's about
talking to people" and "problem solving," tasks for which women are
"eminently better qualified than men."'165
161. Case, supra note 1, at 88-91 (summarizing THE WOMEN'S ADVISORY
COUNCIL TO THE L.A. POLICE COMM'N, A BLUEPRINT FOR IMPLEMENTING
GENDEREQUITY IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1993)).
162. See id. at 89.
163. Robert Scheer, Joseph Wambaugh: iat LAPD Needs Is Women to
Combat Testosterone Level, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1991, at M3.
164. Id. The Christopher Commission similarly reported that many officers
of both sexes "believe female officers are less personally challenged by defiant
suspects and feel less need to [respond] with immediate force or confronta-
tional language." CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 84.
165. Scheer, supra note 163.
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Nine years later when the Rampart scandal emerged from the
depths in which LAPD officers had conspired to hide it, the number
of women officers had increased to nearly twenty percent. 16  But
departmental culture and conduct had not noticeably improved. De-
scribing Rampart as "the worst scandal in the history of Los Ange-
les," Professor Erwin Chemerinsky recommended placing the LAPD
under judicial order and federal supervision through a consent decree
between the city and the U.S. Department of Justice. 167 He called for
an independent commission to conduct a wide-ranging investigation
of the LAPD beyond the limited scope of the Christopher Commis-
sion, structural reforms to deter police abuse and ensure its prompt
discovery, and fundamental changes in departmental culture and
practice. 68 Acknowledging the barriers to cultural reform, his report
nonetheless declared that LAPD management "must accept and im-
plement the Christopher Commission's mandate to move from the
over-aggressive paramilitary policing culture to one of openness,
problem solving, and community engagement.'
169
In a letter earlier this year to city officials, two well known
feminists and a former woman police chief provided another reason
to hire more women police officers. They wrote:
The comparative lack of women in the LAPD reinforces
and exaggerates a workplace culture that condones
authoritarian personalities, where men with common back-
grounds and values participate in misconduct with no fear
of scrutiny by their like-minded peers or detection by su-
pervisors. Rafael Perez summed it up when he told investi-
gators that female officers could not be trusted to be "in the
loop," meaning that female officers could not be trusted to
abide by the "code of silence" if they had knowledge of
misconduct or corruption. Adding significant numbers of
166. See CHEMERINsKY REPORT, supra note 24, at 55; see also Beth Shuster,
Some Say Gender Balance Is Remedy for LAPD Troubles, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2000, at B1 (reporting that the number of women officers in the LAPD
"hovers at about 18%").
167. See CHEMERINSKY REPORT, supra note 24, at 40, 139. The city has
since agreed to federal supervision. See Daunt, supra note 29.
168. See CHEMERJNSKY REPORT, supra note 24, at 12-16, 139-150.
169. Id. at 45.
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women to the LAPD will break up this "squad room men-
tality.'
170
As Joseph Wambaugh suggested, women leaders and officers
almost certainly would be far more ready and able than men to ac-
cept the challenge of transforming the police force. The problem is
that too many male officers are unready and unable to accept women
even as partners in law enforcement. As Chemerinsky found, despite
their increased percentage, women officers in the LAPD still are
subject to serious hostility and discrimination.'17  Nonetheless, they
also remain far less likely than men to abuse their authority: "The
vast majority of the officers known to have committed misconduct in
the Rampart [scandal] were male."'172 A study by two women's
groups, conducted in response to the Rampart revelations, reported
that the cost to the city of lawsuits over the last ten years involving
male officers accused of excessive force, sexual assault, or domestic
violence was twenty-three times the cost of similar misconduct cases
involving female officers, although the ratio of men to women offi-
cers on patrol was four to one.' 73 Both groups and Professor Chem-
erinsky recommended stronger efforts to achieve the "gender bal-
ance" mandated by the city council, including "[a]ggressive outreach
and recruitment" and, possibly, hiring requirements to remedy past
170. Letter from Katharine Spillar, Penny Harrington, and Abby J. Leibnan,
to City Officials (May 18, 2000), quoted in CHEMERINSKY REPORT, supra note
24, at 54-55.
171. See CHEMERINSKY REPORT, supra note 24, at 55; see also Beth Shuster
& Vincent J. Schodolski, Poor Morale Rife in LAPD, Sunvey Finds, L.A.
TIMES, Sept 8, 2000, at Al (reporting that an independent survey conducted
for the Los Angeles Police Commission showed a "divided and demoralized
force"; some respondents criticized low entry standards, specifically blaming
affirmative action designed to increase the number of minority and women of-
ficers for the problems with the force).
172. CHEMERINSKY REPORT, supra note 24, at 54.
173. See Shuster, supra note 166. The city paid S63.4 million for male mis-
conduct, and S2.8 million for female misconduct. No women officers were
named as defendants in sexual assault or domestic violence cases. See id.;
Feminist Majority Found. & Nat'l Ctr. for Women and Policing, Gender Dif-
ferences in the Cost of Police Brutality and Misconduct a Content Analysis of
LAPD Civil Liability Cases: 1990-1999 (Sept. 5, 2000), available at
http'/feminist.org/police/ExcessiveForce.htnl (last visited Sept 20, 2000).
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and continuing discrimination 174 as well as to change the culture of
the LAPD.
III. FEMINIST JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EMPLOYING
WOMEN POLICE OFFICERS
Most feminist legal theorists would learn without surprise that
the Los Angeles police force has neither welcomed women officers
nor achieved gender equality. Law enforcement, like military com-
bat, is culturally 75 gendered male partly to preserve for men a mo-
nopoly of legitimate violence-a myth they cannot relinquish with-
out also surrendering what many men seem to believe, consciously
or not, to be an indispensable core of their masculine identity, the ca-
pacity for domination of others and the regular performance of that
domination to ensure their place in the male hierarchy. The Supreme
Court unhesitatingly deferred to this notion of manhood when it en-
dorsed the "fundamental principle" that women should not routinely
engage in fighting wars, 76 although the fundamental facts are other-
wise: women have been front-line soldiers, sometimes unwillingly,
"throughout recorded history."'
177
Violence and masculinity may also intertwine not just because
men value domination but because they fear loss of autonomy and
identity, and seek to defend them by separating, even violently, from
the encroachments of domination by others, usually male, or of inti-
macy with others, often female. 178 In this account, violence is not an
174. CHEMERINSKY REPORT, supra note 24, at 55.
175. It is gendered, or culturally encoded, as male, but not sexed or biologi-
cally encoded. Apart from potential body strength, women are not signifi-
cantly limited in their innate physical capacity to think and act violently
against or with others.
176. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 77 (1981).
177. Colonel Fred L. Borch III, Camouflage Isn't Only for Combat; Gender,
Sexuality, and Women in the Military; Battle Cries and Lullabies: Women in
War from Prehistory to the Present, 164 MIL. L. REv. 235, 236 (2000) (book
review).
178. See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING:
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 173 (1978) (asserting that
in order to grow up male, boys must separate from the caregiving mother);
Harris, supra note 1, at 786 n.34 (referring to "[m]en's need to defend them-
selves at all costs from being contaminated with femininity"). The unstable
combination of control, intimacy, and separation is still another pattern, some-
times associated with domestic violence.
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expression of strength but a simultaneous admission and denial of
weakness. Violence escalates when masculinity is challenged, to
keep the admission hidden and unacknowledged. Violence is doing
gender as a cover-up for insecurity. From still another perspective,
criminal violence and police violence are a brother act, in which
male gender expectations are fulfilled on both sides. Crime, espe-
cially violent crime, and police work are both overwhelmingly male
occupations. The police officer and the criminal clarify and solidify
their roles in the mirror of confrontation with each other.179 "Street
gangs and elite police squads are bitter enemies, but they are also
united in a kind of masculine community,"' 18 defined in part by the
use of violence and the exclusion of women.
Hypermasculinity also correlates with lower class and social
status,' 8 ' which characterized nearly all policemen (though not po-
licewomen'82) in the preprofessional era of the early 1900s and may
still be partly true for entry-level positions today. The professional
model of police work and its ideal officer, "the fierce warrior-robot,
devoid of emotions or personality," reject other types of police work
or personal characteristics: "anything not related to capturing or an-
nihilating the enemies of law and order, or personal styles that [are]
open, warm, and communicative.' ' 83 The hypermasculine culture of
police work makes it difficult for men to accept women as equals. If
women become successful patrol officers, police commanders, and
police chiefs, the gender hierarchy is destabilized, even overthrown,
and those who relied on it are left unprotected. Although the fear of
women's competition and equality is itself an emotion, and evidently
a powerful one, it is never so identified by the men whose actions
express it. It is transformed instead into a factual statement about the
nature of police work, even though study after study has demon-
strated that professional crime control by aloof and hostile strangers
179. See Cannon, supra note 27, at 66 (quoting disgraced former officer
Rafael Perez: "Whoever chases monsters should see to it that in the process he
does not become a monster himself.).
180. Harris, supra note 1, at 793.
181. See id. at785.
182. See APpimR, supra note 1, at 65-66 (noting that early policewomen were
mostly upper-middle or middle class; policemen were predominantly working
class); MILLER, supra note 1, at 80.
183. MILLER, supra note 1, at 83.
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with disproportionate upper body strength does not even accomplish
the purported goal-it is ineffective in controlling crime.
184
What, then, do feminists have to say in favor of employing more
women police officers? Consider first the classical liberal feminists
who favor formal equality and warn that legal acknowledgment of
gender differentiation will nearly always be used to discredit and dis-
advantage women in the competition for equal employment and the
search for equal respect. The Christopher Commission and author
Joseph Wambaugh endorse women police and seek their participa-
tion and leadership because they can talk to and listen to people bet-
ter than men can, solving problems before rather than after a situa-
tion escalates to confrontation and violence, and because they have
the judgment, patience, and compassion to wait rather than to take
actions that risk harms to or from recalcitrant suspects or bystanders.
Nonetheless, many men and some women may hear, embedded in
this praise, a deconstructive counterpoint: that women talk and men
act, that women shun risk and may compound the danger to civilians
or to other officers by failing to respond effectively when decisive
action is needed, and that women compensate for deficiencies of
physical skill and courage by confessing fear and shifting the danger
to others. If women cannot or will not carry an equal share of the
load, why hand it to them in the first place?
The feminists who wrote the letter to city officials 8 5 further
contend that most women police officers will neither participate in
nor remain silent about corrupt practices or police violence and
abuse, undermining the infamous "code of silence" that makes it
seem as though organized crime-fighting has absorbed the perverse
ethics of organized crime.' 8 6 To most reasonable observers, that is a
strong reason to hire women not only alongside of but instead of
men. If one takes the strictures of formal equality seriously, how-
ever, this scenario offers no reassurance that women will be equally
qualified partners in the shared enterprise. For classical liberal femi-
nists, the idealized woman, the one entitled to equal employment and
184. See id. at 84.
185. See CHEMERINSKY REPORT, supra note 24, at 585.
186. See id. at 18-22. "Blowing the whistle, even to stop law-breaking [by
other police officers], marks cops as traitors of a vaunted code of silence and
inviolable covenant of loyalty." Id. at 21.
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equal pay, is one fully ready to compete and cooperate with men on
their terms, without seriously disturbing organizational culture or
values. The women that Wambaugh and the letter writers describe,
whatever their virtues or, rather, because of their virtues, are neither
fungible with male officers nor potential participants eager to join
and ratify the status quo. They are, instead, unsettling and even
threatening agents of change.
Moreover, because these women who differ from men seem like
better police officers because of their differences, the liberal feminist
analysis is in some danger of deconstructing itself. Liberal legal
feminists, or at least those who adhere strictly to the model, may pur-
sue formal equality at the expense of substantive justice, accommo-
dating not only male standards of performance but of misconduct as
well. The sociological account of women police officers as cultur-
ally both different and better does not fit within the classical liberal
paradigm of sex equality. From this liberal perspective, the pre-
dominant reason to hire women must be that women are like men,
not different from them, and deserve the same treatment and the
same opportunities. Liberals reject arguments based on sex and gen-
der differences-even supposed superiority in virtue and perform-
ance. Women who claim entitlement to the job of law enforcement
without fulfilling the standard requirements for police work-even
stereotypical and questionable standards like upper body strength and
an aggressive attitude-are seekers of special treatment who do not
qualify for protection under antidiscrimination laws.
Of course, this account of classical liberal feminism is only a
fiction, some might say a caricature. No liberal feminist would
really insist on a symmetry so complete that women must assimilate
even violent and corrupt misconduct that interferes with job per-
formance, or conform to physical standards irrelevant to doing the
work. But who decides? And by what process? From outside the
police culture, it is likely that most people believe that Rampart, like
the Rodney King beating, was police crime, especially unforgivable
because we the people gave the government power to enforce the
laws on our behalf, and instead it used that power to break these laws
so completely that some of the victims can never put the pieces of
their lives back together. And perhaps a few of us-those most vul-
nerable to batons or guns when police misunderstand, mistake, or
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deliberately choose to inflict harm--will whisper, it might have been
us. But the state jury members who acquitted the officers who beat
Rodney King did not see what the world saw on that videotape.
If the King beating, or even lower levels of questionable vio-
lence and mistreatment of criminal suspects are practice as usual,
women who oppose them--or report them-are likely to be deval-
ued, stigmatized, isolated, disciplined, demoted, or even discharged
for not conforming to the male norms of the institution.'8 7 The re-
quirement of unthinking loyalty to other officers seems deeply em-
bedded in police culture. Male patrol officers, denying the existence
of gender discrimination in a progressive midwestern police depart-
ment, told researchers that when anyone joins the force, "we just
want to know if you are a team player, if you keep your mouth shut,
if you don't tattle to the brass, and if you can be counted on for
backup."188 Even assuming that the men intended to include basic
competence in their evaluation, it seems remarkable that three of four
stated grounds for inclusion and acceptance of women refer to as-
similation into the existing culture rather than to performance on the
job, and two of four relate to the often denied but often demonstrated
code of silence.
Consider next the second set of liberal "difference" or "accep-
tance" feminists, who believe that the workplace can and should ac-
cept, accommodate, and even appreciate biological and perhaps some
cultural differences between women and men, in order to achieve
substantive equality in the real world. Because their theory is more
closely linked to lived experience, their analytical model may fare
better in some cases, especially those involving female biological
characteristics, or caregiving choices or obligations, that the law too
often has dismissed as irrelevant to work. Although these concerns
are not necessarily implicated in encouraging or requiring the LAPD
to employ more women to resist the internal culture of corruption
and violence, working conditions that accommodate the biological
distinctions between men and women and the cultural patterns of
187. See id. at 20 (providing examples of LAPD officers who were "subject
to reprisals," "forced out of the Department" or resigned after reporting do-
mestic violence or use of excessive force by other officers).
188. MILLER, supra note 1, at 175.
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women's lives might be a small step back from the centripetal force
of masculine culture.
Training and technology can minimize biological differences in
size and strength that favor male job performance. Workplace rules
in both form and practice can respect rather than evade laws against
sexual harassment. Even a police department that provides day care
for employees' children or that allows parents some flexibility in
working hours need not let criminals run free because the officer's
nanny did not arrive that morning. Anyone who has done work that
must be done at a particular time and place not always specified in
advance knows that scheduling can be ruthlessly autocratic or sensi-
bly flexible. The employer and coworkers can choose to make it
easy or difficult. Liberal difference or acceptance theory suggests a
feminist argument for modest changes that make police work more
attractive to women.
In addition, because liberal difference feminists do not believe
that women must replicate male qualifications and performance to
hold the same jobs, they may contend directly that some gender dif-
ferences can improve the workplace. If women's cultures, experi-
ences, and perspectives seem likely to raise the quality of the work
accomplished and lessen its dangers, especially of serious dysfunc-
tional behavior like violence and corruption, women need not aban-
don their strengths or redefine them as weaknesses to conform to
gender stereotypes about the inexorable masculinity of police work.
They can argue that women deserve the jobs precisely because, as
women, they are more likely to maintain their integrity in situations
that tempt men to perform in line with obstructive gender role ex-
pectations instead of professional standards.
They cannot argue this openly, however, because current struc-
tures of employment discrimination law formally demand either sex-
and gender-blindness or justifications closely connected to signifi-
cant biological differences.' 89 A hiring strategy that openly prefers
women because their gender (sex plus cultural) differences from men
189. Title VII, for instance, permits hiring decisions based on sex only if sex
is a bona fide occupational qualification, narrowly defined. See Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994); United Auto Workers v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (rejecting broad "fetal protection" rules as
unjustifiable).
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will improve job performance by maximizing certain qualifications
and characteristics is likely to fail the legal tests for sex discrimina-
tion because the employer could hire instead on the basis of those
qualifications and characteristics rather than on the basis of gender or
sex. One possible way around this legal obstacle would be for the
LAPD to acknowledge its history and culture of sex discrimination,
and to adopt hiring goals and workplace rules designed to raise the
percentage of women as fast as possible and to overcome police-
men's resistance to working on an equal basis with them. Another
way would be for a court to require it.' 90
A more skeptical reading of liberal difference feminism, how-
ever, would suggest that under current law and under its own incom-
pletely theorized' 9 ' response to biological and cultural differences
between women and men, the most that this theory can justify is an
acceptance of some, mostly biological, female differences from the
male norm and a legal determination either to disregard them in dis-
tributing social and legal benefits or to accommodate them, where
possible and socially beneficial, in the workplace. Acceptance of
women as equal-though-different partners in law enforcement may
be a better justification for increasing the number and percentage of
women officers than denial of genuine sex-specific differences and
insistence that a woman can be "the best man for the job." But,
alone, it is scarcely enough.
At first glance, cultural feminists, who openly celebrate what
they perceive and define as characteristically feminine virtues of
caring and connectedness, are in an excellent theoretical position to
190. See CHEMERINSKY REPORT, supra note 24, at 55 n.13 (stating that
LAPD's history of discrimination "would justify gender-based remedies in or-
der to comply with federal law," despite California state laws against affirma-
tive action).
191. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv.
L. REv. 1733, 1735-36 (1995) (suggesting that participants in legal controver-
sies may resolve differences by agreeing on results and on "narrow or low-
level explanations," rather than on "fundamental principle"). The difference or
acceptance feminists characterized here do not necessarily agree even on their
primary theoretical allegiance. Some of them might describe their own views
as variants on cultural, radical, or postmodern, rather than liberal, feminism.
See generally Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 1279 (1987) (proposing an "acceptance" model as a method of harmo-
nizing gender differences with sex equality).
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justify the hiring of women police officers as a remedial response to
police misconduct. Their direct acknowledgment and support of
such values, their demand for a theory of moral development that is
both generous and complex enough to incorporate relational values
as complete, coherent goals and ideals, rather than rungs part way up
the moral ladder to discovery of hierarchically fixed principles and
rights, leads to a theory of nondiscrimination that not only takes ac-
count of biology and gender but includes that account in our soci-
ety's moral, political, and legal narrati',es of equality and justice.
More specifically, cultural feminism can justify employing women
along with or instead of men to enforce the law because they will
treat criminals as errant--though sometimes dangerously deviant-
members of the local, cultural, and national families, rather than as
strangers to be exiled from the community with whatever force is
necessary to re-establish social order and control. Cultural feminists
can argue that women police officers are likely to put into practice
their relational morality and their concern with maintaining and
strengthening social networks, thereby reducing the alienation and
anger that produce and characterize criminal socialization and crimi-
nal conduct. Women can work more effectively to detach potential
criminals from antisocial alternate families like gangs because they
understand and respect the human need for acceptance and nur-
turance within a community.
Cultural feminism also has some support in history. The origi-
nal policewomen were early cultural feminists, in their insistence that
women are better able to prevent crime and in their belief that cul-
tural differences between men and women could be acknowledged
and put to practical use in the joint enterprise of enforcing and ad-
ministering criminal justice. Writer Joseph Wambaugh, the former
police officer, echoed cultural feminists in suggesting that at least
half the police force should be female because women generally per-
form better than men as communicators, listeners, and problem-
solvers-the skills he considered most important for successful law
enforcement.
Nonetheless, at least three problems remain unresolved. First,
as an impartial observer might ask, what's love got to do with it?
Although successful communities may sometimes wisely emulate
idealized families by tempering justice with mercy, forgiveness, and
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eventual return to the fold for even the most prodigal of sons or
daughters, feminist policing is still law enforcement and women po-
lice officers are nonetheless enforcers of the laws. In its purest form,
the cultural feminist justification risks isolating or trivializing women
police officers, in their presumed role as nurturing caregivers, from
central tasks like crime prevention, deterrence, detection, and arrest
and detention of suspects-thus replicating the fate of the founding
mothers of women's police work.
It is easy enough to maintain that laws can be best enforced by
focusing on prevention and cure of the social and individual prob-
lems that lead to crime, on acquired and internalized knowledge of
the community to be policed, on a minimum rather than a maximum
show of force, and by combining this "feminine" sensitivity to crime
and criminals with an uncompromising recognition that victims and
potential victims deserve genuine, unhesitating, and decisive protec-
tion. The cultural stereotypes of successful motherhood-its combi-
nation of love and discipline--may be invoked to demonstrate that
most women are capable of learning the appropriate skills and far
more likely than men to know when and how to use them1
92
But it may be harder to argue that women who embody this vi-
sion of law enforcement in practice will generally succeed in legiti-
mating their authority and commanding respect. Feminist scholars
have often noted that male-dominated culture is deeply ambivalent
about motherhood and that men, consciously or not, often equate
growing up male with separating from the sometimes sanctified,
sometimes demonized mother whose nurturance, though originally
necessary and desirable, becomes a hindrance to the achievement of
independent manhood. 93 To justify the hiring of women as police
192. See APPIER, supra note 1, at 53. Appier discusses the "close... match
between the idealized policewoman and the idealized mother [in] descriptions
of policewomen's crime prevention work" in the 1920s. Id. This comment is
not meant to ignore the serious restrictions on women's lives that the pre-
sumption of motherhood imposes. See LUKER, supra note 10, at 193-94 (de-
scribing modem abortion debate as "a referendum on the place and meaning of
motherhood"; although "the embryo's fate... seems to be at stake, the abor-
tion debate is actually about the meanings of women's lives"); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 1 (1993) (arguing that under patriarchy, all women are pressured
to become mothers).
193. See CHODOROW, supra note 178, at 9 (asserting that motherhood cen-
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officers, cultural feminism may need an auxiliary theory of female
authority that depends on the capacity of women to negotiate or tran-
scend differences between women and men that may limit, or be per-
ceived as limiting, women's ability to lead, to guide, and if necessary
to control, discipline, and punish 194 adults as well as children.
The relational emphasis of cultural feminism may also, some-
what paradoxically, suggest that women officers, as they reach sig-
nificant numbers in the police force, will no longer conform to past
and current statistics showing that they are far less likely to partici-
pate in, excuse, overlook, or condone police abuse and corruption. If
women were less estranged from and more completely integrated
into the law enforcement community, they might become more likely
to accept and even conceal the transgressions of the men they work
with--the surrogate professional family that is far more easy to
identify, join, and nurture than the larger, more abstract, multi-
layered, dissonant, and discontinuous community of civilians to be
protected and criminals to be restrained. Because cultural feminism
focuses on the value of maintaining personal relationships, perhaps
even at the occasional expense of principles, it may at least partially
contradict the necessity for evaluation and judgment. The more a
police force is culturally feminized, a skeptic might argue, the less
likely it is to be rigorously self-critical, self-policing, and obdurately
opposed to violating the constitutional and human rights whose pre-
eminence is insistently questioned by cultural feminist theory.
Finally, the cultural feminist justification for hiring women po-
lice officers raises the same questions that have been directed at cul-
tural feminism in general. The nurturing mother and the relational
moralist are stereotypes that not all women-not even all mothers-
actually exemplify. Cultural feminism risks inaccurately essentializ-
ing all or most women as different from all or most men in ways that
trally defines "social organization of gender" and reproduces male dominance).
194. Though punishment is not within the police officer's formal authority,
the choice of whom to arrest under what circumstances begins the legal chain
of consequences that may lead to formal imposition of criminal punishment.
Threats of arrest and prosecution--along with the abusive processes that often
accompany them--function as informal but widely recognized systems of
punishment in American law and culture. One reason for reluctance to employ
women as police officers is the patriarchal norm that assigns the task of serious
punishment both within and outside the family to persons acting as fathers
rather than as mothers.
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have long been used to stigmatize and devalue women, and to im-
prison them in the limited expectations of a society that disregards
similarities and exaggerates differences between the sexes and then
translates these supposedly neutral facts from description to pre-
scription. Women need not be rigorously classical liberals to seek
the freedom and autonomy that cultural feminists tend to classify as
male or to prefer rights to relationships in moral and legal decision-
making, at least when dialogue or conversation fails and choices
must be made. Women who value both rights and relationships, both
reason and emotion, who recognize potential harmonies and con-
flicts, and who have the wisdom to strike a balance in particular
cases without insisting on a gendered dichotomy, seem closer to the
ideal, both as police officers and as human beings.
Radical feminists can offer the most straightforward reason for
increasing the number and percentage of women police officers to
fifty percent or more: to take the heavy boots of law enforcement off
the iron feet of male oppressors and free the necks of women who
are beginning to learn how not to be oppressed. Women then will
rehumanize police work to further gender equality, instead of sexual
oppression, and to destabilize and desexualize the prevalent police
culture of masculine aggression that leads to violence and corruption.
Radical feminism has no problem with gendered decision-making
that helps women, and no interest in placating liberals and others
who clamor for neutral standards. There are no neutral standards in
radical feminist theory because men have always been the measure
by which standards are set.' 95 The proper use of law is to establish
an equality on behalf of, and defined by, women and other victims of
systems of social dominance.
The analysis is incomplete, partly because radical feminists tend
to focus on strategies for limiting the power of men to hurt, silence,
and degrade women, rather than on explanations of how women will
wield government power if they ever get it, or whether they would
behave differently, if at all, from men. It also fails to answer the
question how a police force with more or less equal numbers of men
and women will bridge the gender chasm that, from a radical
195. See MAcKiNNoN, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 61, at
248.
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feminist perspective, distances them from each other and from the
possibility of compromise and cooperation. But the hope of social
transformation is implied in the insistence on creative struggle here
and now, with the legal and social materials at hand. When "sub-
stantive rights for women" replace abstractions that serve male expe-
rience, according to MacKinnon, "[t]heir authority would be the cur-
rently unthinkable: nondominant authority, the authority of excluded
truth, the voice of silence" that will embody "women's point of
view."'196 Beyond equality, we do not know what that voice will say.
A skeptic might argue that we do know that employing women
is not sufficient to change recalcitrant social institutions. Gender is
one of the most important identities and determinants in our lives,
but it is not always the dispositive one. The others-race, class,
work, family, sexual orientation, religion, politics, and, equally im-
portant, our individual selves as we discover and construct them over
a lifetime-also affect how we think and feel. If for no other reason
than that all of us are shaped by the complex interactions between
identity and experience, it can be argued that most women are more
like most men in most respects than they are different from them,
and that all important differences between women and men are not
based on male supremacy. If that is true, then the radical critique
may disintegrate because it cannot prove that all or most power is
significantly gendered or that gendered power is the primary expla-
nation for the oppression of women in society or in any particular
setting. In police work and other areas of criminal justice, empirical
research so far shows that women on the job are not a catalyst for
significant change. "Neither policing, nor prison work, nor law have
been radically transformed or even become much kinder and gentler"
even though more women are now involved in those activities.
197
A radical feminist might reply, however, that women have found
it difficult to resist "the gendered structure of occupations and
196. Id. at248-49.
197. Britton, supra note 14, at 70-71; see also Jeffrey Toobin, Women in
Black, NEw YORKER, Oct. 30, 2000, at 48, 54 (reporting that women judges in
Harris County, Texas, many of them former prosecutors, enforce the death
penalty just as relentlessly as men judges). "The evidence from Texas suggests
that although diversity may serve some laudable goals---creating equal oppor-
tunities, dispelling stereotypes-it has had a minimal impact on the quality of
justice meted out by the Texas courts." Toobin, supra, at 54.
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organizations"'' 98 because they are part of the male-dominant culture
that devalues women and because they join the work in progress.
They have no other place to stand that would make it easier to move
the world. Unless they can find or create an opportunity to restruc-
ture the work itself, they must develop the tactics of successful
males, or they are likely to fail. But that does not mean that, if the
chance of revolution is offered by circumstances or can be con-
structed with the knowledge gained, they would not take it. If the
radical feminist justification for employing women as half of the po-
lice force is to improve the quality of justice, it relies on a hypothesis
that is so far unproven. But if the rationale is to empower women as
equal citizens by entrusting them with a difficult but necessary social
task, to give them access and opportunity for performance of a job
that has long been reserved to men and relentlessly gendered as hy-
permasculine, to encourage women to learn the job in order to find
ways to transform or transcend it, then the radical feminist critique,
as in the case of sexual harassment, may help us find ways to sup-
plement or replace male dominance with female equality.
Because postmodern feminists resist gender essentialism and
determinism, their justification for hiring more women police offi-
cers, is necessarily, like their theory, pluralistic and open-ended. On
a practical level, postmodern feminists, rejecting any across-the-
board commonality, would expect some women to excel at talking
and listening to people in the community, other women to display in-
genuity and resolve in solving crimes, and still others to replicate and
reinforce both the good and the bad in the male culture that sur-
rounds them. They would expect some women to fail or lose interest
in police work and move on to another job, and some to find ways to
transform police work into a social institution that takes account of
women's stories--to make it a source of feminine or androgynous,
rather than masculine, identity and social power. Postmodern femi-
nists would endorse hiring women as half of the police force to
widen the range of possibilities in women's work and women's lives,
to empower women by giving them more opportunities for leader-
ship, to change society by giving it more opportunities to recognize
and respect women as leaders, and to change law enforcement
198. Britton, supra note 14, at 71.
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through new perspectives on the laws being enforced and on the pro-
cesses of enforcement.
Because postmodern legal feminists see gender as constantly
constructed, reconstructed, and deconstructed by the flow of events
in society and in the lives and experiences of all men and women,
they are likely to view the process of re-gendering even hypermas-
culinized police work as open to intervention by legal and other
feminist discourse-not just through the commands of positive law
like antidiscrimination statutes or interpretations of the Constitution,
but also through the ways in which law resonates within our individ-
ual and social consciousness to change our attitudes and our conduct.
To some extent, postmodern feminist theory is meta-narrative, a
story or a set of stories about other stories that other feminist legal
theories and feminist legal narratives tell about women and men. It
suggests both that none of them is fully true and that all of them are
partially true, if only because they represent some of the many possi-
ble voices of women situated in particular lives, jobs, and societies
and asking themselves whether law or legal discourse is a useful re-
source for changing or challenging the social narrative that domi-
nates their world.
Postmodem legal feminism is subject to the criticism that in its
insistence on the contingent and the particular, on the multiple and
discontinuous identities in individual experience, it may dismantle or
diffuse the category of women, the sex that has been subordinated,
silenced, and denied equal rights, and thus may interfere with efforts
to remedy sexual inequality. Men seem to know who women are, or
who counts as women, when constructing male privilege and female
disadvantage. Society and law know where women live, how to find
us, and how to lose and exclude us. Postmodern legal feminism risks
submerging the social, legal, and economic reality of gender-based
injustice, in talking about words, discourses, and texts instead of us-
ing more popular, accessible, and legally approved ways of speaking
to demand substantive change in specific legal practices, including
law enforcement, that have excluded or marginalized women in the
real world. In a legal system dominated by categorical, often binary
thinking, it can be argued that women need to recognize themselves
as integrated identities, subjects who can speak plainly about them-
selves, and who can demand recognition and rights in words that can
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be heard and understood, not just by legal decision-makers, but by
other women and men who would join the feminist enterprise if we
learn how to speak to them in their language.
For critical race feminists and critical white feminists, who often
criticize other feminists for failing to take sufficient account of ra-
cisn, the inclusion of police women of color is necessary to replace
sexual oppression with equal justice. African American women,
Asian American women, Latinas, and other racial or ethnic minority
women may respond with anger and dismay to the whiteness of sex-
ism as reflected in other feminist theories, and to the ways in which
feminist theory has sometimes obliterated the importance of race and
class, and described the sexism experienced by upper-middle-class
white women as though it were universal. By not talking about race,
by assuming that race is secondary, by separating race from sex and
gender, even by ghettoizing black or other minority women's femi-
nism as a subgenre, rather than as a necessary part of feminist rebel-
lion and critique, feminist theories can make whiteness invisible and
perpetuate white privilege and supremacy. This phenomenon is
openly reflected in the suggestion in this Essay that half of the police
force should be women, without specification of race as well as gen-
der. A police force that was fifty percent white women would nei-
ther reflect the demographics of Los Angeles nor be likely to address
the complex hypermasculinity of police work, in which factors of
race, class, and sexual orientation combine with gender to construct
intersecting patterns of male dominance and female submission or
exclusion.
The multidimensional experiences and perspectives of women
of color are lost not only when "white, straight, and socioeconomi-
cally privileged [women] claim to speak for all of us," but also when
white women or women of color express or act on the belief that race
can be essentialized either separately or along with sex, to produce a
single voice for each combined category of race and gender.' 99 For
199. See Harris, supra note 82, at 255. Lesbian feminists may justifiably ar-
gue that a complete account of anti-essentialist feminism should include a rec-
ognition of sexual orientation as a significant, sometimes dispositive factor,
both in how women define themselves in opposition to male dominance, and in
how they are perceived and evaluated on the job. In Susan L. Miller's socio-
logical study of gender in an unusually diverse police force, involving signifi-
cant numbers of both straight and lesbian women, a few male patrol officers
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critical race feminists, and for critical white feminists who seek to
renounce white supremacy, it is not enough to add that, of course,
policewomen of color should be sought, employed, and trained for
positions of leadership along with white women. It is important also
to recognize that different women of color will see prejudice from
different perspectives, even within racial groups, and that their oppo-
sition to male hegemony may differ from that of white women for
many reasons, including experiences of domination and devaluation,
sometimes by men of color, that seldom form part of white women's
stories of sexual inequality. To exaggerate the point, while white
feminists sought cultural approval to leave their children and seek ca-
reers in the early 1960s, most black women had no choice but to
work in order to feed and house themselves and their children. Black
women were disproportionately denied, not the opportunity to work,
but the opportunity to choose whether to work or to stay home. Even
if the more precise comparison is between women of the same socio-
economic class, the stories of women's lives are likely to vary along
racial lines as well. On a topic that may seem trivial, but that affects
many women, Angela Harris observes that "the ideology of beauty
concerns not only gender but race., 200 The complicated hierarchy of
skin color that divides African American women among themselves
has no clear analog in the experience of most white women.20'
Critical race and critical white feminists therefore may argue
that women of color should be hired as police officers because they
are women of color who deserve to hold jobs that for too long have
been gendered male and reserved primarily for white men, because
they offer additional perspectives of general value to law enforce-
ment, and because they are more likely to understand the combined
race and gender dynamics of crime in general or of particular crimes
nonetheless conceded that among themselves they classify women police offi-
cers as "'bitch,' 'dyke,' 'whore,' or 'prude' .... Similar stereotypes or cate-
gories did not exist for men." MILLER, supra note 1, at 177. Among these
four stereotypic, female-gendered epithets, "dyke" stands out as the only one
that refers primarily to sexual identity. The other three imply heterosexuality
and stigmatize women on the basis of additional characteristics.
200. Id. at 260.
201. See id. at 260-61. African American women and men both experience
this hierarchy, though not in exactly the same way. For both sexes, it has
functioned as a social and an economic barrier, and as a source of pain, sad-
ness, and anger.
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which have different causes and patterns within different racial and
ethnic groups. 202 But, even more than the argument for hiring po-
licewomen because they are women,203 the argument for hiring
women of color because of their race or ethnicity challenges the os-
tensibly neutral structure of constitutional analysis, especially equal
protection claims, of statutory antidiscrimination law, and, more fun-
damentally still, of the moral and legal imperatives upon which they
are based. It is, in effect, to make claims to affirmative action and to
forward-looking remedies 20 4 that would help to construct a more just
and equal society-a claim that the current Supreme Court has been
unwilling to hear. By continuing to insist that sex or race-based clas-
sification-rather than exclusion, stigma, subordination, or oppres-
sion-is the identifying characteristic that triggers constitutional and
statutory prohibitions on discrimination,0 5 the Court reinforces the
legal invisibility of white dominance and ensures that it will con-
tinue. The struggle to transform the law to take women seriously
202. See id. at 261-63. For black women, rape is "as deeply rooted in color
as in gender.... [T]he paradigm experience of rape for black women has his-
torically involved the white employer in the kitchen or bedroom as much as the
strange black man in the bushes." Moreover, white law has seldom functioned
to protect black women from rape, "since black women were considered pro-
miscuous by nature." Id. at 262.
203. The challenge is "even more" because the Supreme Court's equal pro-
tection jurisprudence subjects governmental race-based decisions to a higher
level of judicial scrutiny than sex-based decisions. Compare Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (strict scrutiny), with United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (intermediate scrutiny).
204. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78, 80 (1986) (writing
that the Supreme Court "has approved affirmative action only as precise pen-
ance for specific sins of racism" committed by a specific government or pri-
vate actor subject to constitutional equal protection or statutory anti-
discrimination law, and not as "a paradigm that would look forward rather than
back, justifying affirmative action as the architecture of a racially integrated
future"). Justice Stevens, dissenting in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986), used police work as an example: "[I]n a city with a
recent history of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably
conclude than an integrated police force could develop a better relationship
with the community and thereby do a more effective job of maintaining law
and order than a force composed only of white officers."
205. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of
Richmond v. Croson, Inc., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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inevitably requires feminists to oppose not only gendered privilege
and oppression but racism as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the different feminist legal theories and their varia-
tions do not tell the same stories about women or offer the same jus-
tifications for engaging them in the important public work of law en-
forcement, the strands of theory can be woven together into a pattern
of strategic argument. Police departments in general, and the Los
Angeles Police Department in particular, should seek to fill at least
half their positions with women because women are the same as
men. To leave them out or limit their participation is to deny them
opportunities for meaningful work, for authority and decision-
making, for challenge, risk, and reward that have long been open to
men, and to deny society the opportunity to benefit from their com-
petitively demonstrated, fairly judged, equal or superior merit. "Sex
classifications," Justice Ginsburg wrote, "may be used ... to pro-
mote equal employment opportunity, [and] to advance full develop-
ment of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people. '206 Police
departments should employ women officers because they are almost
the same as men, except for biology and cultural differences engen-
dered by biology, which change the patterns of their lives and the
perspectives they bring to work but do not disqualify them from ef-
fectively enforcing the law and may give them a deeper understand-
ing of how to police both women and men. Police departments
should employ women officers because women are culturally differ-
ent from men, less confined by hierarchical structures of thought and
work, able simultaneously to wield coercive governmental authority
and to weave bonds of human connection with the subjects of law
enforcement, to police others with humanity, restraint, judgment, and
compassion, and to treat other officers, the public, and criminal sus-
pects with dignity and respect.
Women police officers are valuable, even necessary, to the re-
construction of social justice and the establishment of social order
because male domination of women through sex and violence is a
central and causative factor in male crime, especially violent crime.
206. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
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Women can counteract the system of male dominance because they
have no incentive to keep a method of social organization that has
failed "to advance full development of [their] talent and capacities"
and prevents them from seeking new systems of law, order, and jus-
tice based on "nondominant authority"2"7 and sex equality without
sexual oppression. Police officers who are women of color are valu-
able and necessary, because racism is often inextricably interwoven
with sex and gender and because racial minority women have differ-
ent experiences and perspectives from white women and men of
color as well as white men. Policewomen of color are uniquely situ-
ated to identify and untangle the pathology of white racism and male
sexism, and to generate a system of justice that transcends racism
and sexism without obliterating or discounting race and sex. Police-
women of color are equally situated with all other women and men in
deserving the opportunity both to enforce the law and to transform
the law and the system of criminal justice.
Women police officers who represent a wide variety of experi-
ences and cultures are valuable and necessary, because women are
both the same as men and different from them, because the hyper-
masculine gendering of police work has led to corruption, excessive
force, and extreme violence that harms everyone in society, as indi-
viduals and as groups, and threatens to destroy the social order it os-
tensibly establishes and enforces. Calling in the Girl Scouts is one
important way that we can lessen the violence, increase the peace,
and re-establish trust between police officers and the communities
where they work. Women police officers are, or can be, the van-
guards of a peaceful but powerful transformation of law enforcement
and police culture. As Rampart reminds us, it has long since been
time to begin.
207. MAcKNNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 61, at 249.
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